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Over the past twenty years or so, pragmatism' in one form or another 2
has experienced a remarkably broad resurgence,3 if not a literal renais-
sance. 4 Pragmatists of various sorts have of late flourished in the study5
and practice6 of the law.
The prominence of pragmatism should encourage reflection on what
pragmatism is likely to actually deliver and to not deliver, in practice, over
the long term. Pragmatism in some minimal sense surely engages our
sympathies. Pragmatism in a minimal sense of caring about what actually
*R. George Wright, McCormick Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. The author's thanks goes to Chris Eberle, Heidi Hurd, Faith A. L. Knotts, Paul
LeBel, Mary Mitchell, Michael Perry, and Steve Smith.
1. While no single definition of pragmatism can encompass all the writers discussed below,
we can say that much contemporary philosophical pragmatism involves skepticism or indifference
toward traditional "ambitious" concepts of metaphysics or reality, knowledge, truth, and objec-
tivity. See infra Parts III, IV. Moral objectivity, in turn, has been very simply and very prelimi-
narily defined in terms of the idea that "[ilt is possible to find out about some moral sentences that
they are true." Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Objectivity, in MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL
OBJECTIVITY 65, 68 (Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson, eds., 1996). See, e.g., Jules L.
Coleman, Truth and Objectivity in Law, I LEGAL THEORY 33 (1995) (discussing legal
objectivity).
2. Use of the word "pragmatism" may encompass narrowly technical philosophy as well as
less strictly philosophical approaches. See Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Prag-
matism For the Twenty-First Century, U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 164-69 (1995) (leading example of
less strict philosophical approach).
3. See generally Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996);
Louis Menand, The Return of Pragmatism, 48 AM. HERITAGE 48, 48 (Oct. 1997) (stating "The
Philosophy of Pragmatism ... is making a comeback as the twentieth century draws to a close").
4. See generally Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); see also Cornel West, The Limits of Neopragmatism, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1747, 1747 (1990) (stating "[t]he renaissance of pragmatism in philosophy, literary
criticism and legal thought in the past few years is a salutary development").
5. See generally infra Part IV. Professor Christopher Kutz, in the course of reviewing a
pragmatically themed book by legal philosopher and tort theorist Jules Coleman, reports that his
"recent Westlaw search turned up nearly 200 law journal articles with 'pragmatic' or
'pragmatism' in the title .... " Christopher Kutz, Pragmatism Regained, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1639, 1642 (2002). A similar search some months later resulted in a total of 231 citations. Search
by present author on Westlaw (JLR database) for the title (pragmati!), conducted October 16,
2002.
6. The best known contemporary judicial exponent of some form of pragmatism is Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See infra Part IV.
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"works," about real payoffs, and making decisions with an eye toward
context and circumstance seems somehow reassuringly commonsensical
and easily justifiable. Pragmatism in a more philosophical sense attempts
to somehow deemphasize or entirely set aside some traditionally important
philosophical questions, as we will see particularly in Part III. This article
will focus on some of the most sophisticated and influential versions of
contemporary pragmatism. 7 It will consider what these forms of prag-
matism would eventually come to mean if they were consistently applied in
the important realm of free speech jurisprudence.8 The conclusions as to
the practical meaning of pragmatism for freedom of speech will reflect
some conclusions about the nature and effects of pragmatism more
broadly. 9 Focusing on the important area of freedom of speech will illus-
trate and provide clarification of broader conclusions as to the more general
effects of pragmatism.
By way of conclusion, this article will disagree with those who believe
that pragmatism actually leaves everything substantively the same and is
thus ultimately without any systematic normative impact. We should equal-
ly disagree, however, with those who see pragmatism as a generally
progressive long-term influence on law and culture. This paper concludes
instead that pragmatism neither leaves jurisprudence as it was nor qualifies
as systematically progressive. 10 I will argue for these conclusions argued
for both in general terms"1 and, crucially, with specific reference to freedom
of speech.12 I shall argue that pragmatism does create important decisional
indeterminacies.13 But pragmatism's indeterminacies do not mean that
pragmatism leaves law and ethics substantively as they are. Nor does prag-
matism even of the most sophisticated sort tend over the long term to have
systematically progressive or otherwise attractive consequences. 14
Pragmatist doctrines ultimately tend to drain the life from our most
adequate and circumstantially appropriate moral vocabularies and cannot
properly account for virtually all of the classic free speech values, aims, and
purposes. Pragmatism in free speech adjudication ultimately leads to a
normatively flattened free speech law. In such a flattened landscape,
7. There are a number of contemporary pragmatist theorists, and we shall refer to several in
passing, but our primary focus will be on the sophisticated philosophical pragmatism developed
prolifically over time by Professor Richard Rorty. See infra Parts HI-IV.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Parts III-IV.
10. See id.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Parts III.B. and IV.B.
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progressive constitutional arguments are not easier to make than formerly.
In fact, they are harder to make. Pragmatism leads to a gradual loss of di-
mension and meaning in free speech adjudication, regardless of case
outcomes or the perceived stakes on either side of the case.1
5
These arguments will be developed along the following lines. First, I
will briefly examine several centrally important claims made by classic
American philosophical pragmatism.16 This background is for the sake of a
better understanding of contemporary philosophical pragmatism, especially
the work of Richard Rorty.17 Attention is paid to pragmatism and problems
of realism, truth, objectivity, and what is called philosophical "founda-
tionalism."' 8 I will consider whether Rortyan pragmatism leaves accounts
of vital experiences and of moral and legal issues substantively undisturbed
or even undistorted. 19
I then focus more narrowly on pragmatism in the law and in the free
speech context particularly.20 I offer some examples of pragmatism in the
free speech context.21 I address the implications of Rorty's work,22 but with
attention as well to the work of Judge Richard Posner.23 The discussion of
Rorty and Posner on free speech focuses on some of the values and goals
commonly thought to crucially underlie the scope and limits of freedom of
speech. 24 In the free speech context, philosophical pragmatism tends first to
display indeterminacy, and then ultimately to drain much of the real
significance from free speech adjudication.25 I conclude with a brief look at
a recent free speech case26 viewed with the lenses of Rortyan and Posnerian
pragmatism, before providing a final reminder of some of our most crucial
concerns.27
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Parts III.A. and IV.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See id.
22. See infra Part IV.A.
23. See infra Part IV.B and text accompanying notes 190-218.
24. See infra Part IV.A and text accompanying notes 124-33.
25. See infra Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 200-18.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 219-20.
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II. AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL PRAGMATISM: SOME CLASSIC
PROPOSITIONS
Various forms of pragmatism have been prominent in American
philosophical and legal28 writing. Famously, 29 Charles Sanders Peirce ar-
gued that "[tihe opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate is what we mean by truth and the object represented by this
opinion is the real." 30 The point of this claim, which otherwise might well
be acceptable to various non-pragmatists, 31 is to provoke a reassessment of
our ordinary understanding of seeking truth and discovering the real.32
There is no truth and no reality independent of our collective investigations
and unanimous opinions. And there can be no truth and no reality where
there will be no ultimate agreement.
According to Peirce, to hold something to be true is merely to hold the
opinion, on whatever grounds, that the belief in question will eventually be
accepted, on whatever grounds, by all investigators. 33 The truth or falsity
inquiry thus unstably shifts to the opinions of others, which themselves may
in mirror-like fashion be focused largely on other persons' opinions. In par-
ticular, if pragmatism itself is true, this truth consists simply in the fact that
pragmatism will eventually be unanimously thus adopted.
Who counts as an "investigator" and how long (given the rise and
decline of cultures) counts as "ultimate" on this pragmatist model present
questions of detail. What counts as the same or a different opinion, and
whether we have all agreed on something present, however, a serious prob-
lem of infinite regress. Presumably, "we" must unanimously agree on just
what unanimous agreement itself involves, if there is to be any truth of the
matter. But whether "we" have unanimously genuinely agreed even on this
may be unclear. What sort of unanimous agreement would be required?
That question would itself require unanimous agreement of a further
28. We shall set aside what might be called American legal pragmatism, both old and new,
for consideration below. See infra Part IV.
29. Colin McGinn, Book Review: Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, THE NEW REPUBLIC June
28, 1993, at 27.
30. CHARLES S. PEIRCE, HOW TO MAKE OUR IDEAS CLEAR, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF
PEIRCE 38 (Justus Buchler ed., Dover 1955) (1878). See CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, TRUTH,
RATIONALITY, AND PRAGMATISM: THEMES FROM PEIRCE (2000) (commenting on Pierce).
31. Compare Peirce's formulation with the observation of the non-pragmatist John Stuart
Mill: "As mankind improve [sic], the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or
doubted will be constantly on the increase; and the well-being of mankind may almost be
measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being
uncontested." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 106 (Penguin ed., 1982) (1859).
32. McGinn, supra note 29, at 27.
33. Peirce, supra note 30, at 38.
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unspecified sort.34 But how would we know when we arrived at that further
agreement? Hence the infinite regress problem for Peirce's formulation.
However, Peirce's formulation is only one possible statement of Amer-
ican philosophical pragmatism. Other candidates are available. Consider,
for example, the following from John Dewey:
Instead of impossible attempts to transcend experience, 35 we have
the significant record of the efforts of [persons] to formulate the
things of experience to which they are most deeply and passion-
ately attached. Instead of impersonal and purely speculative en-
deavors to contemplate as remote beholders the nature of absolute
things-in-themselves, we have a living picture of the choice of
thoughtful [persons] about what they would have life to be, and to
what ends they would have [persons] shape their intelligent
activities. 36
Present here is synecdoche 37 and metonymy. 38 Dewey's argument
unfortunately addresses only an extremist who, unlike even Immanuel Kant
himself,39 believes that we can behold "the nature of absolute things-in-
themselves ... ."40 Thus, Dewey opposes pragmatism not to metaphysics,
or to a concern for ultimate reality4 l in any standard sense, but merely to a
particularly implausible metaphysical ambition rejected even by the non-
pragmatist Kant. Pragmatism cannot convincingly establish itself by
undermining only the most extreme forms of rival views.
34. This regress could be stopped only by the non-pragmatic or at least non-Peircean
decision that the truth or falsity of claims about whether unanimous agreement exists, or about
how to define such a unanimous agreement, can be resolved on grounds at least partially
independent of the idea of unanimous agreement. Note also that the regress problem does not cru-
cially hinge on Peirce's claim that the agreement in question must be somehow completely
unanimous.
35. See GEORGE STEINER, REAL PRESENCES 3-4 (Univ. Chi. Press 1989) (contrasting
argument that art and communication more generally must somehow bet on or seek the
transcendent).
36. JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 25-26 (rev. ed., 1948).
37. See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1851 (2d ed. 1983) (defining synecdoche as
taking the part for the whole).
38. Id. at 1134 (defining metonymy as taking something associated with a thing to stand for
that thing).
39. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 351, 401 (2001); Fred R. Dallmayr, Borders or Horizons? Gadamer and Habermas
Revisited, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 826 (2002); David Luban, Justice Holmes and the
Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 474 n.77 (1994).
40. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 302 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans. 1900)
(1787).
41. See infra Part III.A (referencing the meanings of metaphysics and of truth).
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Notable as well is Dewey's reference to things that a pragmatist could
be "most deeply" attached.4 2 One must not casually assume that a con-
sistent pragmatist could continue to use the word "deep" in all of the
standard senses. The range of meanings of some rhetorically powerful
words may ultimately and inevitably be narrowed where the pragmatist
rejects the metaphysics,4 3 or the ambitious assumptions as to what can be
real, that are inseparable from standard meanings of the word in question.
This will make an important difference when the pragmatist is confronted
by the horrific or the ennobling.
To clarify this point, consider the use of the term "deeply," as in "I am
deeply offended," by a pragmatist or even a moral skeptic. It is certainly
possible for even a moral skeptic to be deeply offended by something in
some senses. The idea of "depth" in such a case might include the mere de-
gree or duration of sheer pain the moral skeptic endures, as long as the pain
is not dependent upon any (deeper) metaphysical beliefs, including any
metaphysical beliefs about personal dignity. Perhaps the pragmatist or
moral skeptic could use the idea of "deep offense" merely to report the
unexpectedness of the challenge, and to warn against or discourage further
challenge. Or perhaps the challenged preference is linked to many other
preferences or beliefs, some general and others more specific, held by the
pragmatist or the skeptic. Certainly a pragmatist could associate a prefer-
ence with a long-held, or strong, but non-metaphysically-tainted emotion, 44
and hold a preference "deeply" in this sense.
One could certainly add to this list of ways in which pragmatists or
moral skeptics could hold themselves to be "deeply" offended by some-
thing. The crucial mistake to avoid is to imagine that all of the traditional
and valued possible meanings of "deep offense" remain available to the
pragmatist. They do not. To the extent that a pragmatist abandons meta-
physics, some of the standard meanings of "depth" of offense and of being
"deeply" offended, and their associated rhetorical power, are no longer
logically available to the pragmatist.
42. DEWEY, supra note 36, at 25.
43. See, e.g., infra Part III.A and ALAN MALACHOWSKI, RICHARD RORTY 43 (2002)
(explaining the idea of abandoning or perhaps somehow merely distrusting metaphysics).
44. Some emotions seem to ordinarily involve some sorts of (deeply) metaphysical belief, as
in the case of the emotion associated with reverence for some entity one thinks to be divine. Other
emotions seem to have much more limited metaphysical commitments, as when one fears an
assault not for its implications for one's dignity, but for the prospect of sheer physical pain. See,
e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS
(2001); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: EMOTIONS AND THE MEANING OF LIFE (1993);
RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION (1987); RICHARD WOLLHEIM, ON THE
EMOTIONS (1999) (discussing the philosophy of emotions).
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For example, to a pragmatist who has abandoned metaphysics, nothing
can be deeply offensive because it violates human dignity or the sanctity of
the person in the most standard and powerful senses. Such a pragmatist
may want to protest the underlying event on many grounds, and with what-
ever emotional vehemence is deemed pragmatically best. But such a prag-
matist must either redefine and de-metaphysicalize the terminology of
dignity and sanctity in such a case, or else grant that the violation of human
dignity cannot, for the pragmatist, be meaningful or morally offensive,
deeply or otherwise, in the metaphysically-laden senses. If pragmatists
really abandon metaphysics, they must then abandon any terminology that
bears metaphysical meaning or else re-define the language involved in ways
independent of metaphysics. This is a matter of transparency, candor, and
socially communicative logic. This logic applies against even a pragmatist
who thinks that watered-down versions of truth, reality, dignity, and sanc-
tity are the only kinds that make sense, or who decides what to say about
truth, reality, dignity, and sanctity on "pragmatic" grounds.
Thus far we have seen that among the earlier American pragmatists
there is at least a distrust of, or a disinclination to pursue, questions of
metaphysics. This tendency is allied to a complementary, more affirmative
emphasis on what "works" and on what "pays off," as in the pragmatism of
William James. James minimizes the search for objective truth45 in favor of
truth as a marriage of older and newer experiences conducive to overall
satisfactoriness.46 Any non-pragmatic truth that exists independently of this
marriage or that is otherwise arrived at can be only "the dead heart of the
living tree."47
For William James, "ideas ... become true just in so far as they help us
get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience." 48 More
elaborately, the "test of probable truth is what works best in the way of
leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the col-
lectivity of experiences' demands, nothing being omitted."49
This sort of pragmatism raises a number of questions. First, for James,
an idea could tend to be true as enhancing our relations with some parts of
our experience. But the same idea could tend to be false as somehow
impairing the satisfactoriness of our relations with other parts of our
45. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 31 (Prometheus ed., 1991) (1907). We shall simply
assume that there are no pragmatically or otherwise meaningful distinctions between "probable
truth" and truth itself. See infra text accompanying note 48.
46. JAMES, supra note 45, at 31.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 58.
49. Id. at 44.
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experience. The question naturally arises as to which of these two realms of
our experience is more important than the other. But this question will
likely not have a straightforward pragmatist answer. Which areas of our ex-
perience are somehow more important must be answered only by seeing
which possible answers to this further question themselves fit in most
satisfactorily with all affected areas of human experience. Here, pragma-
tism involves not so much an infinite regress, as a crucial failure to gain any
traction.
Second, it seems possible that allowing us perhaps one falsehood, in
the more traditional sense, might best and most satisfactorily unite broad
bodies of experience. Would such a traditionally conceived falsehood then
earn the status of pragmatic truth? If we are to pass judgment on, say, the
truth or falsity of some basic religious belief, which bodies of whose
experience are relevant? Are both the consolations5 0 and all the
monumental and the petty cruelties of religion relevant to its truth or
falsity? Does a belief become pragmatically truer as it becomes more
emotionally comforting to more persons in more areas of their lives? Is this
the way we want (pragmatic) truth and falsity to operate?
More broadly, how can all the parts of life and experiences be weighed
and sorted?51 The basic problem is not one of omitting some aspect of ex-
perience 52 but of properly classifying and measuring them all on
"satisfactory" pragmatic standards. Does one aim at satisfactoriness in the
sense of somehow maximizing consistency, fit, or interconnectedness
among all our beliefs? Or could satisfactoriness also consist in part in fer-
tility in generating new compatible beliefs? Is happiness a part of our life?
A part of a part? Is happiness an experience? Is satisfactoriness in the
sense of consistency among our beliefs particularly likely to produce
satisfactoriness in the sense of happiness? 5 3 Does humanity expect the most
thoroughly logical persons to in this respect be the happiest? Is the satis-
factoriness of the relations among all our experiences a subjective matter,
an objective matter, or sometimes one or the other? Don't we usually think
of an ideologue or a fanatic as someone whose beliefs and values are
unusually consistent and mutually reinforcing, whether their belief system
overall is true or grossly wrong?
50. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (James Strachey trans., 1961)
(1975 ed.) (1927); KARL MARX, CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT IN KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS 41-46 (Thomas B. Bottomore trans. 1963) (1843).
51. See sources cited supra note 50.
52. See supra text accompanying note 48.
53. Of course, happiness in various senses may depend on many things other than our
pursuing or happening upon the truth.
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One may also wonder whether we are to take the "parts"54 of our lives
as merely given. Surely any serious approach to truth, pragmatist or other-
wise, must sometimes ask us to abandon some of our practices and ideas.
When considering the abandonment of some ideas and the adoption of
others, should one think mostly about the sheer number of new harmonious
relationships within the resulting belief system, including new harmonies
between old ideas? How does one pragmatically address the prospect of re-
vising one's pragmatized identity? And how does one decide the truth of
our beliefs on precisely this matter without setting up yet another infinite
regress-or another tractionless wallow?
More vividly, what if we eventually come to find the universe to be an
unwelcoming, inherently meaningless, ultimately doomed place, in a way
that is permanently unsatisfactory for us? Has such a truth then really "paid
off' or "worked" for us? Has the truth in James' sense led us well 55 in such
a case? Moreover, how do we know which practices and ideas lead us well
or work best for us without some independent idea of what is valuable or
true? Why shouldn't we just calculatedly lead ourselves to more stably
consoling and eventually sincerely held beliefs merely by associating more
with persons and groups who already hold such consoling beliefs?
It may be tempting to say that it is better, or more in keeping with
human dignity, to live maturely by an unpleasant, demoralizing truth than
by a somehow reassuring but false belief. But this would amount to a non-
pragmatic understanding of truth and falsity. For the pragmatist, no view is
true or false until we see its overall payoff. No doubt there are limits to our
ability to delude ourselves with pleasant thoughts. Acting as though each of
us individually were an absolute political ruler will usually not pay off for
us in a pragmatic sense. But there is still plenty of room on the pragmatic
account for a deluded belief that pays off over the long term. With future
advances in radical genetic engineering, pharmacology, brain stimulation,
and the technology of virtual reality, the general character of what pays off
for us pragmatically may dramatically change.
However, focusing on the logical difficulties of James' pragmatism
ignores what we might call the psychological or rhetorical difficulties. It is
psychologically difficult even for the pragmatist to adhere to pragmatist
principles, and even more difficult to avoid reliance on non-pragmatist
resonances and associations in our talk. Consider the example of James'
rejection, on rather dubiously pragmatist grounds, 56 of the traditional ideas
54. See generally, MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS (2d ed. 2002).
55. Id.
56. JAMES, supra note 45, at 53.
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of free will and moral responsibility. 57 In this connection, James asks
"whether any man, woman or child, with a sense for realities, ought not to
be ashamed to plead such principles as either dignity or imputability."58
No doubt James can refer to "realities" or to how someone ought to be
"ashamed" to invoke the ideas of moral responsibility, blameworthiness, or
imputability while at the same time rejecting the traditional idea of being
ashamed. But to one degree or another, the persuasive force of pragmatism
here is improperly borrowed. James cannot consistently give up certain
ideas while retaining their overtones of meaning and their associations, at
least if he wishes to present what an unconvinced audience will take to be a
sound and unobjectionable overall argument. This is not to accuse James of
bad faith. The rich associations of our traditional moral and philosophical
vocabulary, however, cannot be readily set aside by pragmatist speakers or
their listeners. James is in such cases inevitably relying on traditional
meanings and resonances that his pragmatist redefinitions must repudiate.
If we give up dignity, we must give up much of the meaning of shame as
well. At the levels of both logic and psychology, then, James' pragmatism
leaves us with disturbing implications.
III. RICHARD RORTY'S CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM AND
THE DEPTH OF LIVED EXPERIENCE
A. RORTY AND THE PRAGMATIC CULTURE
Among contemporary American pragmatists, probably the most widely
discussed59 is Richard Rorty. 60 Rorty builds upon the work of earlier
57. Id.
58. Id. at 45-46. See infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text (referencing some
contemporary discussions of the free will problem).
59. See, e.g., RORTY AND HIS CRITICS (Robert B. Brandom ed., 2000). See also David
Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM 275, 278
(Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) (referring to "post-philosophical pragmatism, of which Richard
Rorty is the most distinguished exemplar"); H.O. MOUNCE, THE TWO PRAGMATISMS: FROM
PEIRCE TO RORTY (1997).
60. This is not to suggest that contemporary American pragmatism focuses exclusively on
Rorty's work. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983) (providing a sense of the broader inquiry); NICHOLAS
RESCHER, REALISTIC PRAGMATISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY 192 (1990)
(stating "[flrom this standpoint, utilitarianism is straightforwardly tantamount to one particular
version of moral pragmatism"); JOSEPH MARGOLIS, PRAGMATISM WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS:
RECONCILING REALISM AND RELATIVISM (1986) (providing a sense of the broader inquiry);
Henry S. Richardson, Beyond Good and Right: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism, 24
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 108, 113 (1995) (stating "the agent is to deliberate about what she ought to do
in a way that is open both to revising principles of right in terms of the good or ill that would
result from following them and to revising the conception of the good on the basis of insights
about what would be right or wrong to do"); Paul Boghossian, The Gospel of Relaxation: Review
[VOL. 80:103
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American pragmatists by disclaiming any interest in questions of meta-
physics and reality, 61 of truth62 and falsity in any traditional sense, of
knowledge, 63 and "foundationalist" 64 approaches to knowledge in
of Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 10, 2001, at 35 (providing a
sense of the broader inquiry).
61. See 1 RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 21, 22 (1991) (stating "those who wish to reduce objectivity to solidarity-call them'pragmatist'-do not require either a metaphysics or an epistemology. They view truth as, in
William James' phrase, what is good for us to believe") (emphasis in the original). See Michael S.
Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn For the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871,
893 (1989) (discussing who counts as part of "us"). See, e.g., David Papineau, Realism and
Epistemology, 94 MIND 367 (1985) (discussing contemporary approach to realism as a doctrine);
WILLIAM P. ALSTON, A REALIST CONCEPTION OF TRUTH (1996) (same).
62. See 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 21-24. "'[R]ealists' have to construe truth as corres-
pondence to reality. So they must construct a metaphysics which has room for a special relation
between beliefs and objects which will differentiate true from false beliefs." Id. at 22. See also 3
RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1, 11 (1998) (arguing "against
the theory that true beliefs or statements correspond to the intrinsic nature of reality, and also
against the view that we now need a new theory of truth to replace this correspondence theory").
See Moore, supra note 61, at 893; see also Uwe Steinhoff, Truth vs. Rorty, 47 PHIL. Q. 358 (1997)
(discussing the differences between the truth of a belief and its justifiedness). See Philip Kitcher,
On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth, available at http://www.columbia.edu/
~psk 16/correspondencetruth.htm (last visited May 31, 2004) (discussing just one example of an
exposition of the classical correspondence theory of truth). See Eugene Wigner, The Unrea-
sonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences, 13 COMM. IN PURE & APPLIED
MATH 1, 9 (1960) (concluding that "mathematical language has more to commend it than being
the only language we can speak; ... it is, in a very real sense, the correct language").
63. See I RORTY, supra note 61, at 24 (stating "[a]n inquiry into the nature of knowledge
can, on [the pragmatist's] view, only be a sociohistorical account of how various people have tried
to reach agreement on what to believe"). See also Moore, supra note 61, at 893.
64. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 24. Rorty embraces a form of "coherentism," as opposed to
"foundationalism," while denying that his often highly contextualized or localized coherentism is
another highly general theory of knowledge or truth. 3 RORTY, supra note 62, at 171. See also
Paul D. Forster, Pragmatism, Relativism and the Critique of Philosophy, 29 METAPHILOSOPHY 58
(1998). Foundationalism, as rejected by Rorty, involves a combination of basic premises that may
be considered self-evident or otherwise indubitable, along with other beliefs inferable from or
otherwise dependent upon those basic premises. Id. at 171-72. That one could reject foundation-
alism while still being committed to ambitious positions on basic questions of metaphysics and
knowledge is under-recognized by Rorty. Id. at 172. See, e.g., William P. Alston, Two Types of
Foundationalism, 73 J. PHIL. 165 (1976) (discussing the foundationalist versus broad coherentist
debate); Robert Audi, Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism, 2 PHIL.
PERSP. 407 (1988) (same); Michael R. DePaul, Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics,
96 MIND 463 (1973) (same); Nicholas Rescher, Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Idea of
Cognitive Systematization, 71 J. PHIL. 695, 703 (1974) (stating "the foundationalist approach to
justification does not represent the only way of implementing the justificatory process inherent in
the approach to knowledge as true, justified belief"); Joseph Margolis, Skepticism, Foun-
dationalism, and Pragmatism, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 119 (1977); ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANT AND
PROPER FUNCTION (Oxford Univ. Press 1993). Interestingly, some leading contemporary theo-
logians have sought to pursue theology on a non-foundationalist basis. See, e.g., Alvin Plantinga,
Is Belief in God Properly Basic?, 15 Nous 41 (1981) (proper basicality as not involving
foundationalism); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Can Belief in God be Rational If It Has No Foundation?,
in PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 109 (Melville Y. Stewart ed., 1996); STANLEY J. GRENZ & JOHN R.
FRANKE, BEYOND FOUNDATIONALISM 43-44 (2001) (discussing coherence theories); JOHN E.
THIEL, NON-FOUNDATIONALISM 58 (1994) (discussing holistic or non-foundationalist
theologies); THEOLOGY WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS (Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy & Mark
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particular, and of "objectivity" 65 in all of the above contexts. This lack of
interest in objectivity and the like does not make Rorty into a traditional
sort of relativist.66 To embrace relativism in a standard sense would on
Rorty's view be self-refuting and still too philosophically ambitious. 67 Say-
ing that every viewpoint, including pragmatism and non-pragmatism, is
"really" as good as any other viewpoint would hardly allow one to be much
of a pragmatist. Nor does a pragmatist have to rank all cultures as equally
useful even for those directly affected.
In particular, Rorty's rejection of any aspiration to objective truth
includes any search for objective moral truth. Morality cannot transcend
the conversation of any particular community, even though any community
can proclaim the superiority of its own perspective over those of all other
communities. The resulting disputes among moral communities cannot be
neutrally or objectively resolved by good philosophy. 68 There are no ob-
jective moral truths written in the heavens, no "moral facts out there in the
world," 69 no "truths independent of language," 70 and no "neutral ground on
which to stand and argue that either torture or kindness are preferable."
71
While Rorty seeks to avoid claims that purport to be objectively true or
false, he is willing to deny-although presumably merely pragmatically and
non-objectively- "that we possess a deep, hidden, metaphysically
significant nature which makes us 'irreducibly' different from inkwells or
Nation eds., 1994); J. WENTZEL VAN HUYSTEEN, ESSAYS IN POST-FOUNDATIONALIST
THEOLOGY (1997).
65. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 24. The search for objectivity is assumed by Rorty to involve
an ultimately fruitless or unhelpful search for an historical supra-contextual truth independent of
perspective. See generally id. For Rorty, abandoning the quest for objectivity leads us ultimately
to the conclusion that "we must, in practice, privilege our own group, even though there can be no
noncircular justification for doing so." Id. at 29.
66. See id. at 202.
67. See id. (stating "[t]o accuse postmodemism of relativism is to try to put a meta-narrative
in the postmodernist's mouth"). RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 166 (1982).
68. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 173 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1989).
69. Id. But see David Backhurst, Pragmatism and Moral Knowledge, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 227,
227 (Cheryl J. Misak ed., Supp. Vol. 1998)
In the last twenty years there has been a dramatic revival of interest in the idea that
there can be genuine moral knowledge .... It is now common to hear the claim that
moral values are genuine constituents of the furniture of the world-or at least of its
upholstery-and that moral deliberation and judgment legitimately aspire to truth.
Id.
70. RORTY, supra note 68, at 173.
71. Id. It has been argued, even more dramatically, that "adopting the moral point of view
need not involve belief' and may on some series of suppositions nevertheless have pragmatic
value as a "bluff." See, e.g., Richard Joyce, The Fugitive Thought, 34 J. VALUE INQUIRY 463,
472, 476-77 (2000).
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atoms."72 Rorty's unwillingness to draw any metaphysical difference
between persons and inkwells correctly suggests that he does not put much
stock in traditional ambitious understandings of the self or of personhood. 73
On the basis of these minimal selves, we somehow choose to identify
with one or more overlapping or conflicting communities.74 Of course, if
we could choose our communities "pragmatically," that would require that
we already have some sense of what is pragmatically effective for us and
what is not, which would itself have to stem from our already identifying
with one community rather than another. It is thus not easy to get the
pragmatic project gracefully off the ground. Neither reason in general, 75
nor moral reason in particular,76 allows us to transcend the shared
sentiments of our somehow chosen communities in any objective way.
Rorty observes that "[w]e pragmatists argue from the fact that the
emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased
moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories, to
the conclusion that there is probably no knowledge of the sort Plato
envisioned." 77 Whether this conclusion itself aspires to objectivity or to
merely pragmatic truth we shall leave unresolved.
Decisive, then, are our various community or cultural identifications
and the possible conflicts among such identifications.78 We may each think
of our community identifications in various ways, even where such
identifications do not obviously conflict. Rorty himself, for example, refers
to his own identifications in various ways. Rorty refers broadly to "we
72. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 373 (1979).
73. See I RORTY, supra note 61, at 185 n.24 (stating "[iut may be helpful, for purposes of
systematizing our intuitions about the priority of liberty, to treat the self as having no center, no
essence, but merely as a concatenation of beliefs and desires") (emphasis in the original).
74. Id. at 200-01.
75. See id. at 187 n.33 (expressing distrust of any assumed distinction between "mere
preference" and "less arbitrary" grounds for decision as well as for any clear distinctions among
reason, will, and emotion). See Richard Rorty, Universality and Truth, in RORTY AND His
CRITICS supra note 59, at 8 (stating "I cannot see much difference between the bigot's reaction to
me and Habermas and Habermas' and my reactions to him. I cannot see that anything like
Icommunicative reason' favors our reactions rather than his. This is because I do not.., see why
the term 'reason' is not as much up for grabs as the term 'academic freedom' or 'morality"').
76. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 200 (stating "[m]orality is ... a matter of 'we-intentions').
77. 3 RORTY, supra note 62, at 172. Whether those who would resist the culture of human
rights are equally capable of telling equally affecting sad and sentimental or otherwise motivating
stories, or of desensitizing us to the sad and sentimental stories of their opponents, is worthy of
reflection. It is certainly possible that some poets may grow tired of obliging Rortyan pragmatists
by endlessly apotheosizing merely pragmatic Rortyan values with no deeper justification. See
Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner's and Rorty's Justice
Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 97, 143-44 (1996).
78. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 176-77.
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wealthy, secure, educated inhabitants of the First World."79 Alternatively,
Rorty identifies with "the community of the liberal intellectuals of the
secular modem West"80 and as well with "'us postmodernist bourgeois
liberals."' 8'
On this basis, Rorty aspires to "a utopian, inclusivist, human
82
community-one which prides itself on the different sorts of people it
welcomes, rather than on the firmness with which it keeps strangers out."8
3
Social progress consists not in our increasing reasonableness or in gradually
approaching nearer to any truth, but in coming "to see more and more
differences among people as morally irrelevant."84 Specifically, the aim is
"to see the difference between people's religions, nations, genders, races,
economic status, and so on as irrelevant to the possibility of cooperating
with them for mutual benefit and as irrelevant to the need to alleviate their
suffering." 85 Otherwise put, Rorty seeks "a maximally free, leisured, and
tolerant global community," 86 marked by "toleration, free inquiry, and the
quest for undistorted communication."87
However, Rorty specifies that the value of tolerance should be
understood as not merely compatible with policies such as, for example,
"banning pornography" 88 but, more crucially, with distinguishing "the sort
of individual conscience we respect from the sort we condemn as
fanatical." 89 Distinguishing the fanatical from the non-fanatical, 90 or our
79. 3 RORTY, supra note 62, at 7. See also JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DON'T BE
CRUEL: REFLECTIONS ON RORTYAN LIBERALISM 139, 152 (Charles Guignon & David R. Hiley
eds. 2003) (contrasting the power of non-metaphysical and metaphysically-based opposition to
institutionalized cruelty).
80. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 29.
81. Id. at 199.
82. The extent to which one's chosen communities embrace non-human animals, or nature in
general, is in itself presumably not entirely a matter of merely the boundaries of community
membership.
83. RORTY, supra note 75, at 1.
84. 3 RORTY, supra note 62, at 11.
85. Id. at 11-12. The crucial problem with pragmatism here is not that pragmatists cannot get
any critical distance from some important elements of the dominant economic culture, but the
limitations on the ultimate force, persuasiveness, or rational appeal of non-objectivist pragmatic
arguments. See CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, TRUTH MATrERS 114-16 (2002) (discussing this crucial
problem).
86. Richard Rorty, The Decline of Redemptive Truth and the Rise of Literary Culture,
available at http://www.stanford.edu/~rrorty/decline.htm (last visited May 31, 2004).
87. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 29. Why we would, in a pragmatic culture, particularly want
to emphasize "inquiry" in the first place is not entirely clear.
88. Richard Rorty, What Can You Expect from Anti-Foundationalist Philosophers? A Reply
to Lynn Baker, 78 VA. L. REv. 719, 725 (1992).
89. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 176.
90. Id.
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heroes from our enemies, 91 will of course involve no aspiration to
objectivity or to any community-transcending truth.92 Instead, such crucial
judgments are made at the level of the communities with which one already
identifies, largely through exchange of anecdote, in a "relatively local and
ethnocentric 'fashion."'93
Thus toleration,94 or tolerance 95 and free inquiry,96 are at various points
joined with denunciations of what we choose to call fanaticism, as well as
to what Rorty refers to as the "diabolizing" 97 of our constructed local
enemies. Specifically, "we liberals cannot tolerate enemies of tolerance be-
yond a certain point. Our mutual respect does not, and should not, extend
to anti-Semitic hate speech."98
It must be emphasized that Rorty's views on the scope and limits of
freedom of speech and of tolerance do not involve any attempt to seek out
any objectively sound set of principles, with the inquiry naturally beginning
in our own culture. Rorty cannot take this sort of metaphysically ambitious
step.99 Rorty's preferences regarding speech and tolerance instead flow,
91. Id. at 200.
92. Id. at 176.
93. See id. at 176-77 (stating "what counts as rational or as fanatical is relative to the group
to which we think it necessary to justify ourselves-to the body of shared belief that determines
the reference of the word 'we"'). Id. at 201 (discussing the importance of "convention and
anecdote" in this context).
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 200 (noting moral ethos of a culture as formed not so much
through philosophy as through the arts, which modify the group self-image through, inter alia,
"apotheosizing its heroes" and "diabolizing its enemies").
98. Richard Rorty, Book Review, The Trouble with Principle, 82 NEW LEADER 15 (Dec. 13,
1999). See also JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 231 (1988) (interpreting Rorty as
implicitly saying "[t]olerate the superstitious, but only if they agree to hold their fanatical
tendencies in check").
99. See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN
EPISTEMOLOGY 184 (1993) (according to Rorty, "Ulustification is not only a social, but also an
entirely conventional, matter: it makes no sense to suppose that our practices of criticizing and
defending beliefs could be grounded in anything external to those practices"); William G. Weaver,
Richard Rorty and the Radical Left, 78 VA. L. REV. 729, 755 (1992) (noting that for the
pragmatist, "[t]here is nothing like reality or injustice or nature for a proposition to cut into, except
insofar as those notions exist as other propositions in our language"); John Patrick Diggins, From
Pragmatism to Natural Law, Walter Lippman's Quest for the Foundations of Legitimacy, 19 POL.
THEORY 519, 536 (1991) (stating "since indeed philosophy as representation has 'ended,'
philosophy must, Rorty contends, take the 'linguistic turn' and continue as language and
conversation, an exercise not in what we know but in how we speak, write, and engage in other
discursive practices"); Lynn A. Baker, "Just Do It": Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change,
78 VA. L. REV. 697, 703 (1992) (noting "Rorty's claim that his premise simply embodies
Iungroundable desires' for which there is 'no noncircular theoretical backup' is an example of
pragmatism's anti-foundationalist distrust of metaphysical entities as warrants for certitude");
Galen Strawson, Scientific Americans: Review of Philip Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at 7-12.
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circularly, from his choices among possible community identifications, as
those communities are modified by stories and anecdotes.100
Rorty's views on freedom and tolerance not only begin in his
communities, but they end there as well. Rorty's suggested political or
jurisprudential stance can be characterized, as he suggests, as a form of
'"postmodernist bourgeois liberalism.'"101 But if we are interested in any
likely effects of Rorty's pragmatism on jurisprudence in general and free
speech law in particular, consider not just Rorty's philosophical pragmatism
and then, in isolation, his jurisprudence and his free speech law. One must
go beyond probing for any narrowly, dryly, logical inconsistencies between
the two. Crucially, one must try to imagine the long-term practical effects
of a consistent Rortyan philosophical pragmatism on the health of our free
speech law. The thinness of philosophical pragmatism may ultimately have
unexpected and adverse consequences even for a free speech system
designed in accordance with Rortyan political values.
The relationships between philosophical pragmatism and pragmatic
law and politics are contested and unclear. Various sorts of positions on
their relation have been entertained. For some, "pragmatists are committed
to a 'radical democratic' politics." 102 For others, at least, "[an anti-
foundationalist culture by definition will be different from our founda-
tionalist one."103 The majority position seems skeptical of any distinctive
implications of philosophical pragmatism for politics and jurisprudence.
One writer argues that "pragmatism of the [original or traditional]
cognitivist-Peircian variety, does not itself prompt or justify measures
[WIhen Rorty says (so blithely) that only a sentence can be relevant to the truth of
another sentence, a sentence like "Millions of human beings were murdered in the
20th century" comes to mind. For what makes this sentence true, and is therefore
relevant to its truth, is not other sentences in a web of sentences, but the strictly non-
linguistic fact that millions of human beings were murdered in the 20th century.
Id.
100. See supra text accompanying note 78. See, e.g., MOUNCE, supra note 59 (reacting to
Rorty's project); Simon Blackburn, The Professor of Complacence: Review of Rorty and His
Critics, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 20, 2001, at 39 (same); John Dunn, A Postmodernist Mary
Poppins: Review of Philosophy and Social Hope, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPP. 24 (October 6,
2000) (same); Robert Kraut, Varieties of Pragmatism, 99 MIND 157, 157 (1990) (noting "[iut is
not always easy to see what Rorty's various formulations amount to, or how the positions
designated as 'pragmatist' relate to one another"); Joseph Margolis, Richard Rorty: Philosophy By
Other Means, 31 METAPHILOSOPHY 529, 529 (2000) (stating "American philosophy is passing
through a remarkable deformation championed in its forward direction, as a liberating turn, by
Richard Rorty, who is its principal architect and engine"); Carlin Romano, Book Review, Truth
and Progress, 267 NATION 25 (July 27, 1998); Jay F. Rosenberg, Raiders of the Lost Distinction:
Richard Rorty and the Search for the Last Dichotomy, 53 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 195 (1993).
101. 1 RORTY, supra note 61, at 198.
102. Jack Knight & James Johnson, Political Consequences of Pragmatism, 24 POL.
THEORY 68, 68 (1996).
103. Baker, supra note 99, at 712.
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sufficient for political equality. Look to liberal democracy's independent
commitment to autonomy to secure equality of influence." 0 4 Another
writer holds more broadly that "contrary to the claims of critical theorists,
pragmatism yields no privileged perspective from which we can discern the
law's alleged complicity in the oppression of the powerless; rather,
pragmatism yields relativism about truth and justice."105
Even more broadly, it has been argued that philosophical pragmatism
amounts to "a framework congenial to a wide range of substantive ethical
and legal positions."106 And more colorfully, Professor Jack Balkin has
concisely argued that a "legal pragmatist ... can also be (a) a civic
republican, (b) a feminist, (c) a deconstructionist, (d) a case-cruncher, (e) a
crit, (f) a law-and-economics type, or (g) anything else."107
The writers are thus divided between two sets of views on the conse-
quences for law and politics of philosophical pragmatism. Some link prag-
matism to legally and politically progressive trends, but most do not,
instead finding philosophical pragmatism to be, perhaps ironically, without
any inherent political or legal consequence. 108
However, it is important to see that neither of these views is correct, at
least over the long term. This can best be illustrated in connection with the
discussion of free speech law below.109 But the point can be initially clari-
fied by noticing the "flattening" and ultimately trivializing tendencies
toward arbitrariness, over the long term, of Rortyan philosophical
pragmatism.
A Rortyan pragmatist who abandons metaphysics, truth, and objectivity
as aspirations can certainly, for some time, maintain a sort of cultural habit-
104. Judith Baker, Democratic Deliberations, Equality of Influence, and Pragmatism, in
PRAGMATISM 253, 254 (Cheryl Misak ed., 1999).
105. Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical
Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535, 537 (1993). Rorty, as we have seen, is not a relativist in the
sense of believing, say, that it is objectively true that each community's culture or beliefs really
are just as good as any others. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
106. Christopher Kutz, Pragmatism Regained, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2002). See
Brian Leiter, Book Note, Marxism and the Continuing Irrelevance of Normative Theory If You're
an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1150 (2002) (stating "If
high quality moral philosophy does not change the behavior of high quality moral philosophers,
why think it is going to affect anyone else? There is, of course, no reason to think anything of the
sort."). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 44 (2003) (noting
"the suggestion that the pragmatic outlook favors social democracy or legal liberalism is
unconvincing. Pragmatism has no political valence"). See id. at 45 (referring to the "Darwinian
underpinnings of pragmatist philosophy"). See PETER SINGER, TOWARD A DARWINIAN LEFT:
POLITICS, EVOLUTION, AND COOPERATION (2000) (discussing a politically left Darwinism).
107. J. M. Balkin, The Top Ten Reasons to Be a Legal Pragmatist, 8 CONST. COMMENT.
351,351 (1991).
108. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
109. See infra Part IV.
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based or historically accumulated political momentum. The Rortyan need
not feel compelled to abandon any of the vocabulary traditionally associated
with even the most profound, or the most deluded, metaphysics. Pre-
sumably, the Rortyan will want to deploy the most rhetorically effective
moral and legal vocabulary available. The pragmatist can use traditional
and still evocative moral language without emphasizing that the language is
now being used in an evacuated and non-metaphysical sense.
Nor should it be assumed that a Rortyan pragmatist would be incapable
of great rhetorical fervor. Even a young child can be capable of intense
emotional expression. Over the long term, the absence of any aspiration to
objectivity in the pragmatist framework may actually tend to dampen the
fervency of pragmatist rhetoric. There is certainly nothing in the meantime
to disqualify the pragmatist from seeking to "diabolize"l10-in a pre-
sumably non-metaphysical sense of the term "diabolical"-the pragmatist's
selected political opponent. 1
Through re-definition of the key moral and legal terminology, the
pragmatist can set aside metaphysics, and the quest for knowledge, truth, or
objectivity, and continue superficially to talk as before. In fact, there is
really nothing to stop the pragmatist from boldly approaching terms such as
"metaphysical," "knowledge," "truth," and "objectivity," and continuing to
use these very terms in new, diluted, pragmatist senses. One should ques-
tion, however, the long-term practical effectiveness of the underlying
pragmatist rhetoric. No doubt the pragmatist rejection of traditional meta-
physics and the like does not immediately radiate throughout all of one's
beliefs, immediately disabling all those emotions, thoughts, and motivations
that are logically dependent upon the now abandoned belief in metaphysics.
But a sophisticated audience must eventually begin to silently question the
real status and persuasive value of the underlying non-objectivist, if
impassioned, pragmatist rhetoric.
110. See supra note 98.
1l1. JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW 280 (1999). It is useful for pragmatists and
non-pragmatists alike to recall that "devotion to a particular, historically embedded, narrative-
specific way of life has led to violent persecution of the other at least as often as a commitment to
an a-historical moral universalism." Id. We may conclude that the pragmatist may certainly seek
to increase the political power of like-minded pragmatists, and may well have various reasons for
doing so. But the pragmatist cannot be either motivated or constrained by supra-pragmatic con-
siderations, and may well be especially tempted to redefine her pragmatist "commitments" in the
face of a need for any substantial genuine personal or group sacrifice. See MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 36-39 (1998) (discussing the background of this theory). See Jean
Hampton, Should Political Philosophy Be Done Without Metaphysics?, 99 ETHICS 791, 807
(1989) (discussing further reluctance to abandon traditional philosophical inquiry in favor of
rhetoric and socialization).
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B. PRAGMATISM AND LIVED EXPERIENCE
In some cases, the difference between pragmatist rhetoric and
traditional metaphysically-oriented rhetoric may seem as clear as the dif-
ference between seeing in two dimensions versus seeing in three. Consider
the possibility of trying to pragmatize and to metaphysically reduce
personal, lived experiences of the Holocaust. Ultimately, to pragmatize the
lived experiences and accounts of the Holocaust, however intense the
pragmatist's own reactions to the Holocaust undoubtedly are, is akin to
losing an entire descriptive dimension.
Let us think of a summary reminiscence of Primo Levi:
They crowd my memory with their faceless presences, and if I
could enclose all of the evil of our time in one image, I would
choose the image which is familiar to me: an emaciated man, with
head dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose
eyes not a trace of a thought is to be seen. 112
If we think of this evil as not merely pragmatically evil, but as
somehow also genuinely or objectively evil, are we unjustifiably rejecting
pragmatism, or, rather, are we coming closer, though certainly still im-
perfectly, to seeing things as they are? One should feel reluctant to abandon
the latter interpretation. No merely pragmatic interpretation of the Holo-
caust seems the best we can hope for.
Or consider a moment of Levi's indignation at a fellow inmate: "Can
Kuhn fail to realize that next time it will be his turn? Does Kuhn not under-
stand that what has happened today is an abomination, which no
propitiatory prayer, no pardon, no expiation by the guilty, which nothing at
all in the power of man can ever clean again?"ll 3 Let us try to reflect on
such experiences and reactions. Would it be objectively or even merely
112. PRIMo LEVI, SURVIVAL IN AUSCHwrrZ 90 (Stuart Woolf trans. 1996) (1958).
113. Id. at 130. The "objectivity" and metaphysics of this sort of Holocaust experience thus
extends beyond not only Rortyian pragmatics, but also beyond the "common sense" realism and
objectivism of some of Rorty's critics. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS 99-101 (2002)
Rorty is right in saying that it makes no sense to think of standing outside of one's
thoughts and concepts and comparing "reality as it is in itself' with those thoughts and
concepts. How could that idea make sense? What Rorty has done is to move from the
unintelligibility of this sort of guarantee to a skepticism about the possibility of
representation in a perfectly everyday sense.
Id. Putnam adds, however, without metaphysical elaboration, clarification, or explanation that we
can talk about objects in a way that "sometimes gets the facts right." Id. at 100 (emphasis in the
original). TZVETAN TODOROV, FACING THE EXTREME: MORAL LIFE IN THE CONCENTRATION
CAMPS 29-30 (Arthur Denner & Abigail Pollack trans. 1996) (regarding Primo Levi on the
concentration camps: "'Fundamental values, even if they are not positive, can be deduced from
this particular world.' My book... is simply an attempt to follow Levi's precept").
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pragmatically better if one reduced what Levi is telling us to bare pragmatic
dimension? Pragmatism in such a case is an impoverishment.
Or we may think of Elie Wiesel's recounting:
We marched slowly on, as though following a hearse at our own
funeral. Four steps more. Three steps. There it was now, right in
front of us, the pit and the flames. I gathered all that was left of my
strength, so that I could break from the ranks and throw myself
upon the barbed wire. In the depths of my heart, I bade farewell to
my father, to the whole universe; and in spite of myself, the words
formed themselves and issued in a whisper from my lips: Yitgadal
veyitkadach shmO raba .... May His name be blessed and
magnified .... My heart was bursting. 1 4
Wiesel has recourse here to metaphor and other figures of speech."15
But pragmatism is not about recognizing the existence of metaphor. We
must ask whether, in reducing Wiesel's account of this experience to prag-
matically acceptable dimensions, we risk losing more than our arguable
metaphysical misunderstanding and illusions. Does one not risk losing the
insight that not all experiences, not all reports, and not all discourses are
metaphysically flat or metaphysically void?
Consider, finally, an experience of Victor Frankl:
I was roused one night by the groans of a fellow prisoner, who
threw himself about in his sleep, obviously having a horrible
nightmare. Since I had always been especially sorry for people
who suffered from fearful dreams or deliria, I wanted to wake the
poor man. Suddenly, I drew back the hand which was ready to
114. ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT 31 (Stella Rodway trans., 1982) (1958). Can the pragmatist better
help us adjudicate among, if not discard, the distinctions among delusion, frenzy, vision,
prophecy, insight, and apparent "possession?" See id. at 23 (describing a woman on a train who is
apparently delusional, "continued to scream, breathless, her voice broken by sobs, 'Jews, listen to
me! I can see a fire! There are huge flames! It is a furnace!"'). Or can the pragmatist better
accommodate the "conversation" between Wiesel and his father: "For a long time this argument
went on. I felt that I was not arguing with him, but with death itself, with the death he had already
chosen." Id. at 100. Are all conversations pragmatically reducible, with only metaphysical dross
and excessive metaphysical ambition lost in the reduction?
We should emphasize that while some examples of metaphysical and objectivist alternatives
to pragmatism may have a religious character, there can of course be non-religious metaphysical
and objectivist claims. This is certainly one way of interpreting the basic Kantian claim of
"reverence" for law-Achtung vor dem Gesetz-for the sake of free action from duty. See
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 19-20 (Lewis White Beck
trans. 1959) (1785); THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL
THEORY 36-37 (1992); H. J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 63-65 (1948). See, e.g.,
PAUL WOODRUFF, REVERENCE: RENEWING A FORGOTTEN VIRTUE 15, 46, 49, 64-68, 117-18,
124-25, 136 (2001) (validating explicitly non-religious acts of reverence).
115. See generally supra note 114.
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shake him, frightened at the thing I was about to do. At that mo-
ment I became intensely conscious of the fact that no dream, no
matter how horrible, could be as bad as the reality of the camp
which surrounded us, and to which I was about to recall him."16
Such experiences suggest that ideas of truth and even of knowable truth
can sometimes have an objectivity, a groundedness, a confrontedness, a
transcendence of any mere group context or group convention, whether
pragmatism proposes to ignore such qualities or not. 1 7 These limitations of
philosophical pragmatism exist, in less dramatic fashion, whenever im-
portant moral and legal values are at stake. This includes the important area
of free speech law, as we shall now see. Despite its indeterminacies,
Rortyan pragmatism in the long run does not leave free speech law as it
found it, but neither does it exert a systematically progressive influence on
the law.
IV. FREE SPEECH LAW AND THE PROBLEMS OF PRAGMATISM
A. PRAGMATISM AND THE DEPTH OF THE FREE SPEECH VALUES
The scope and limits of free speech law are central to American
constitutional law."18 Admittedly, there is no single approach to free speech
law that draws unanimous assent."19 But what is of value in the various
mainstream approaches to freedom of speech cannot be entirely reduced to
pragmatist dimensions. Pragmatism cannot encompass our best account of
the scope and limits of free speech law.
This is not to say that pragmatists must reach some allegedly wrong
result in some free speech cases. The problem with Rortyan philosophical
pragmatism, apart from its indeterminacies, is not that the method will not
give us what we might consider the right outcome in some free speech
case. 1 20 Rather, the problem is that Rorty's lack of interest in questions of
116. VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 48 (1985) (1946).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09.
118. See GEOFFREY STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 993-1365 (4th ed., 2001)
(devoting 372 pages to freedom of speech, apart from its treatment of freedom of the press, and
excluding annual paperback supplement coverage).
119. See, e.g., Leading Cases: 1. Constitutional Law: 2. Judicial Elections, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 272, 276-80 (2002) (contrasting "functionalist" and "antifunctionalist" approaches to
freedom of speech) (discussing Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)).
120. We shall attempt to sort out only to the degree necessary the pragmatic differences
among Rorty's varied formulations of his approach to, say, metaphysics, ranging as they do from
apparent dismissal for intellectual implausibility, to suspicion or distrust, to the sense that some or
all traditional questions of metaphysics are not practically worth pursuing, or do not matter. See
MALACHOWSKI, supra note 43, at 43 (discussing the idea of setting aside metaphysics and
epistemology, rather than being entrapped within them).
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truth, objectivity, and metaphysics impairs his ability to defend or reject
free speech claims in their full dimensionality.
Think for a moment about why we might want to give some general
constitutional protection to speech. The standard sorts of reasons under-
lying free speech protection include concern for the values of self-
realization,121 the pursuit of truth, 22 and democratic self-government.123
Each of these important free speech values can in a limited sense be
endorsed by philosophical pragmatism. But pragmatism in free speech law
cannot tell all the story we wish to tell.
Begin with the idea of freedom of speech as promoting self-realization.
For example, self-realization could in a "thin" sense refer to something like
self-gratification, or to being consistently able to control and achieve one's
most desired long-range goals, however arbitrarily chosen and of whatever
social or objective value.124 However, self-realization also refers to the
ideas of development, of genuine growth, and of moving from potential to
fulfillment in a more objective and metaphysically-laden sense. 125 In this
sense, self-realization may be somehow comparable to blossoming or flour-
ishing, perhaps even in roughly the way that an acorn may develop into a
full, healthy oak tree. 126 The crucial assumption, though, is not one of
teleology but of moving from objectively lesser to greater value.
The classic exposition of self-realization as a movement from the
objectively less developed to the objectively more developed in the context
of free speech is, of course, that of John Stuart Mill.127 Mill's discussion of
what one might call objective self-realization through free speech is more
detailed than can be quickly conveyed, but we can herein cite at least a few
representative Millian beliefs.
Mill argues that "freedom of thinking"128 is "indispensable to enable
average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable
121. See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593,
602-03 (1982).
125. See, e.g., id. at 593, 604; Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-80 (1963). See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-
Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998) (discussing general background). See
also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 152-53 (1989)
(discussing the "justification for free speech.., that the government should treat people with
dignity and equality.... Under this view, suppression represents a kind of contempt for citizens
that is objectionable independent of its consequences") (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., T. H. IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PRINCIPLES at 94-116 (1988) (discussing
Aristotle on teleology, development, and final causation).
127. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin 1984) (1859).
128. Id. at 95.
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of." 129 Without freedom of discussion, "we cannot hope to find that
generally high level of mental activity which has made some periods of
history so remarkable."' 30 In general, "the intellect and judgment of man-
kind ought to be cultivated .... "131 Ultimately, Mill seeks to promote "the
highest and most harmonious development of [the person's] powers to a
complete and consistent whole."132 The objective growth and development
process generally requires the exercise of a broad range of one's mental
powers. 33
It is possible to interpret these, along with any number of other,
excerpts from Mill in some sort of merely pragmatist or conventionalist
fashion, in which truth rises no higher than the preference, advantage, or
consensus of some arbitrarily identified group. Perhaps just about any
verbal formulation can be interpreted in pragmatic terms. But it is as an
historical matter difficult to believe that Mill intended something like a
merely pragmatic understanding of the free speech value of self-realization.
More strongly, it can be said that it is Mill's aspiration to an objectively
greater degree of truth, to genuine progress, and to development beyond
mere popular change that accounts for much of the long-standing evocative
power and inspiring character of Mill's essay. One need not deny that Mill
appeals to utility' 34 in a broad sense of the term, and to the close
129. Id.
130. Id. at 96.
131. Id. at 97.
132. Id. at 121.
133. Id. at 123. Classically, the idea of objectively higher and lower degrees of development
or functioning, with no particular reference to free speech, is particularly evident in Aristotle. See,
e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS book ten, 177a, at 328 (J.A.K. Thomson trans.
1953)(rev. ed. 1976).
If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable to assume that it is
in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be the virtue of the best part of
us.... [C]ontemplation is ... the highest form of activity (since the intellect is the
highest thing in us, and the objects that it apprehends are the highest things that can be
known).
Id. See id. I 178b, at 330-31.
[i]f the intellect is divine compared with man, the life of the intellect must be divine
compared with the life of a human being. And... we ought, so far as in us lies, to put
on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in
us; for in power and preciousness it far excels all the rest.
Id. See also ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS book lambda, 1072b, at 260 (Richard Hope trans. 1960)
(noting "the activity of mind is also its life, and the divine is that activity. The self-sufficient
activity of the divine is life at its eternal best"). These citations are meant only to illustrate
possible objective metaphysical understandings of self-realization, not to endorse any such
approach over another. Certainly, there can be metaphysics with no recourse to the divine.
134. Mill famously forswears any appeal to the morally right apart from utility, and instead
relies on "utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest
sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being." MILL, supra note 127,
at 70.
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relationship between truth and utility. 35 It can even be accepted that an
identification of utility with some form of usefulness, and some form of
usefulness with the touchstone of philosophical pragmatism. But conceding
all this would show only that both Mill and the pragmatist appeal crucially
to the criterion of usefulness in one or more senses of the term. It would
not show that Mill's understanding of what is useful sets aside the ideals of
objectivity and of genuinely greater and lesser truth and self-realization.
Mill's understanding of the free speech value of self-realization allows
for, and insists upon, the possibility of aspiring toward identifying
objectively higher and lower levels of self-realization, generally, and in the
specific context of freedom of speech. Pragmatic approaches to self-
realization cannot, by definition, accommodate this distinctive dimension of
free speech theory.
This deficiency of pragmatic free speech theory risks what most
persons would regard as a serious moral loss. It has been shown 136 how
describing the Holocaust with any modest faithfulness to lived experience
requires a framework that transcends pragmatism's lack of interest in the
objectively more and less true and the objectively better and worse. An ac-
count of the Holocaust in strictly pragmatic terms, even a strongly
emotional and vividly descriptive account, that did not somehow borrow the
associations, resonances, and overtones of supra-pragmatic accounts would
strike most persons as in just this respect ultimately deficient. In many free
speech contexts, of course, the differences between pragmatic and supra-
pragmatic accounts of what is at stake will not be as striking as in the case
of the Holocaust. But the differences, even if less vivid, will be no less real.
To see this, recall not only pragmatism's setting aside any possible
objectivity of truth, but pragmatism's indifference to metaphysics,137
including the metaphysics of the self that is to be realized through free
speech.138 If we are not irreducibly and objectively different from, say,
inkwells, 39 and if the self is ultimately just a series of beliefs and desires, 40
the pragmatic self cannot possibly be realized in the sense held open by
135. Mill writes that "[t]he truth of an opinion is part of its utility." Id. at 82. "In the opin-
ion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can really be useful."
Id. at 82-83. Mill thus does not say even that the utility of an opinion constitutes its truth, or even
part thereof. If a true belief may or may not be useful, truth can hardly be defined in terms of
usefulness. And we certainly need not here either endorse or reject Mill's partial linkage of truth
and utility. See POSNER, supra note 106, at 384 (characterizing Mill as in a sense a "proto-
pragmatist").
136. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
139. See supra text accompanying note 73.
140. See supra note 74.
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Mill. Even talking inkwells, insofar as they remained inkwells, could not
possibly realize themselves, at least in any sense about which we should
feel bound to care.
More directly, a de-metaphysicalized self-an organic robot,141 with
successive emotions and experiences but certainly lacking any metaphysical
freedom of the will142-could not realize itself through speech or otherwise,
in any sense that matters.143 Some organic robots or inkwells, simple or
complex, may be more pragmatically useful than others. But organic robots
and inkwells do not possess a self that is capable of genuine development or
flourishing. Neither do the pragmatic selves that are not ultimately dif-
ferent from complex organic robots or complex inkwells.
One might welcome the abandonment of the metaphysics of the self, of
free will, and of genuine moral credit and responsibility if none of this
pragmatically mattered or, even better, if as a result morality-dependent
forms of cruelty and suffering would be reduced and blaming tempered or
eliminated. But as the complex organic robot image suggests, a moral
world with metaphysics and the metaphysical self set aside might not be a
recognizable moral world at all, let alone a moral world of tolerance toward
appropriate persons and the "diabolization"144 of others. With the reduction
of the sorts of cruelty based upon moral blaming or moral desert might well
come a gradual loss of meaning in ideas such as dignity, apology,
forgiveness, the deepest sorts of love and gratitude, and even of any
genuine achievement, as opposed to our merely identifying with certain
productive causal chains and events.
141. See, e.g., J. R. LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 29-30 (1993) (noting the lack of genuine free
will as leaving us with the lives of "mere automata"); GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF
291 n.22 (1986) (raising the "organic robot" analysis for entities not presumed to be capable of
genuinely free will or in this sense genuine moral agency); PETER VAN INWAGEN, METAPHYSICS
203-08 (2d ed., 2002) (finding morality as self-evidently an illusion if there is no free will, and no
one can consistently reject free will in their own actual subjective experience).
142. See ROBERT KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL (1996) (attempting to defend the
meaningfulness and the reality of freedom of will); TIMOTHY W. O'CONNOR, PERSONS AND
CAUSES: THE METAPHYSICS OF FREE WILL (2000) (same). See SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL
AND ILLUSION (2000) (discussing the possible consequences of any genuine and consistent
abandonment of traditional metaphysical doctrines of free will, genuine moral agency, and
genuine moral responsibility). Richard H. Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV.
875, 892-93 (1994) (citing PETER F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER
ESSAYS 7-14 (1974)) (arguing that abandoning free will and autonomy in the relevant sense would
make little practical difference). See also DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 187-
213 (2001) (arguing for some likely gains and losses to ordinary life under such assumptions)
(citing TED HONDERICH, A THEORY OF DETERMINISM 513-19 (1988)).
143. This is not to deny that an organic robot could be programmed to repair itself and even
enhance some of its functions by internal feedback. Presumably, though, this does not exhaust
what Mill means by self-realization.
144. See supra note 97. In a literal sense, of course, one cannot "diabolize" anyone without
adopting metaphysical assumptions and beliefs.
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If one were to genuinely take ourselves to be only metaphysically
minimal selves, there is every risk that most current non-pragmatists, and
indeed some current pragmatists, would not care for the eventual result.
The consistent abandonment of free will and of all moral responsi-
bility-deserved credit as well as genuinely deserved blame-and the
familiar, if mysterious, metaphysical self might well strike us, with our
current progressive values, as debilitating,145 terrifying,146 a degrading of
the quality and depth of human relationships,147 and as involving a great
loss of value,148 with a flattening, a hollowness, and an increasing
manipulativeness in human relations. 149
This is not to suggest that a world without familiar metaphysics, even
of the self, would be a cold, morose place, perpetually embarrassed and
acutely conscious of what it has gained and lost. There could, after all, in
all logic be neither genuine pride nor genuine embarrassment in such a
place. Perhaps hooking up to Robert Nozick's extremely gratifying virtual
reality "experience" machines would eventually be a popular permanent
choice. 150 We could eventually genetically design ourselves to find in-
creased entertainment in all sorts of low-cost events. But however popular
such options might eventually be in a de-metaphysicalized society, the
pragmatist can hardly expect to appeal to current progressive attitudes with
such a prospect.
None of this suggests that the value of self-realization is always best
served by judicially finding in favor of the speaker and against the party
seeking to restrict the speech at issue. Some instances of speech can be
aimed not so much at anyone's enlightenment as at intimidation and bare
discouragement. One way of thinking about hate speech is to ask whether
the free speech value of self-realization in such a case actually lies more
145. Donald L. M. Baxter, Free Choice, 67 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 12, 17 (1989).
146. Paul Benson, Book Review of Richard Double, The Non-Reality of Free Will, 101
MIND 364, 367 (1992).
147. Susan Wolf, The Importance of Free Will, 90 MIND 386, 395 (1981).
148. Randolph Clarke, Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility, 66 PHIL. STUD.
53, 55 (1992). See also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 291 (1981).
149. Without the metaphysics to support "dignity," there can at most be the social rela-
tionship to support "price." See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 102 (Mary Gregor trans. 1998) (1785); ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT
143 (1999).
150. ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974). See also Robert
Young, The Value of Autonomy, 32 PHIL. Q. 35, 38-39 (1982). See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37-39 (1998) (discussing the theory that emphasizing gratification in a de-
metaphysicalized culture is an extreme example of the broader problem of why a pragmatist
should endure significant uncompensated avoidable sacrifices for the sake of whatever values the
pragmatist has opted to embrace).
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with the unwilling targets of verbal abuse than with the speakers.151 To the
extent that it does, a free speech theorist would have a reason based in the
value of self-realization to restrict the speech in question.
Let us conclude that the free speech value of self-realization, as we
ordinarily understand this value, cannot prudently be entrusted to
pragmatist care. Ultimately, the consistent pragmatist can accommodate, at
most, only a limited version of self-realization. Bracketing truth, objecti-
vity, and the metaphysical may well pay off in terms of usefulness on some
occasions. But in setting aside the goals of truth, objectivity, and meta-
physics in the context of self-realization, the pragmatist hurts more than
helps and ironically fails William James's own usefulness-oriented test for
truth. 152
To be sure, the value of self-realization is only the first of the values
thought to crucially underlie freedom of speech. The free speech values of
the pursuit of truth5 3 and of democratic self-government154 are arguably
also important. Truth, particularly the aspiration to the ideal of objective
truth, is famously important to Mill's defense of freedom of speech.155 The
pursuit of truth as a free speech value has been judicially endorsed56 and
has attracted a range of critical commentary. 157
151. Richard Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven
Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1998); Wojciech Sadurski, Offending With Impunity, 14 SYDNEY L.
REV. 163 (1992). In this context, it is useful to remember the Supreme Court plurality's
observation that "[a] requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on
the form, rather than the content of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that
cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 743 n.18 (1978). Something of this logic may underlie the court's approval of the criminali-
zation of public cross-burnings intended to intimidate. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
153. See supra text at note 122.
154. See supra text at note 123.
155. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 127, at 78.
[I]t is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no
more infallible than individuals ... every age having held many opinions which sub-
sequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many
opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages.
Id. With respect to a free speech pragmatism of usefulness, Mill observes that "[tihe usefulness of
an opinion is itself matter [sic] of opinion... as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring
discussion as much as the opinion itself." Id. at 82. Determination of free speech cases on any
sort of pragmatic ground is indeed likely to be surprisingly complex. See infra text accompanying
notes 176-90. Again, we should point out that there is, technically, no way to prove that Mill or
anyone else was not a pragmatist, as virtually any claim can be given some sort of a pragmatist
interpretation, or in some sense endorsed by a pragmatist.
156. At least the idea of political truth in particular is central to Justice Brandeis' classic
concurrence in Whitney v. California. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (stating "[tihose who won our independence believed.., that freedom to think as
you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth"). See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (referring to Justice
Brandeis' classic concurrence "speech that is 'indispensable to the discovery and spread of
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But one need not separately discuss the deficiencies of philosophical
pragmatism in accounting for truth as a free speech value. It is nearly
impossible to separate the pragmatist's setting aside of any objectivity of
truth from the pragmatist's limited account of self-realization as a free
speech value.158 Whether we think of truth as a goal in describing the
Holocaust experience,159 or of truth, as variously understood and as-
sessed,160 as a free speech value, there is little here to add beyond our
discussion of the self-realization value. The discussion of pragmatism and
truth as a free speech value would be not merely analogous to our
discussion of the self-realization value, but structurally the same.
This is not to suggest that anyone who endorses a pursuit-of-truth
approach to free speech must be committed to the reality, or even the
possibility, of objective truth, or to anyone's ability to actually recognize
objective truth.' 6' And it is certainly possible for pragmatists to adopt truth
as a free speech value while denying that truth is ever objective. A pragma-
tist can certainly argue that in some cases free speech will promote truth in
the sense of usefulness to a given community, or truth in the sense of
whatever some community somehow already assents to.
162
What the pragmatist account of the truth value cannot encompass,
again, would be truth in the sense in which the above Holocaust accounts
163
aspire to be most deeply and valuably true. In contrast, the quest for the
political truth"' as "that form of speech which the Framers of the Bill of Rights were most anxious
to protect") (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980) (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
157. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 130-31 (discussing defenses and critiques of
truth as a free speech value); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of
Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 703 (1987) (stating "freedom to believe false ideas
should be respected, not because beliefs cannot be known to be false, nor because false beliefs are
valuable in themselves, but rather because the freedom to believe false ideas is a necessary con-
dition for the possibility of genuine, voluntary belief in true ideas"); William P. Marshall, In
Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995)
(stating "[t]he value that is to be realized is not in the possible attainment of truth, but rather, in
the existential value of the search itself"); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974 (1978) (stating "the hope that the marketplace
leads to truth, or even to the best or most desirable decision, becomes implausible" partly because
"truth is not objective"); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away
From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1243-44 and n.211
(1983) (discussing Professor Baker's theory in this respect and linking Baker's approach to
Rortyan pragmatism).
158. See supra notes 125-53 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text
160. See supra notes 125-53 and accompanying text.
161. Marshall, supra note 157, at 4.
162. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 83-102 (citing examples of the sorts of non-
metaphysical, not-purportedly-objectively-true beliefs Rorty wishes to assert in community).
163. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
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objective general or particular truth of the Holocaust can in principle make
progress, or can regress, and can recognize some of what pragmatism must
miss.
The third free speech value, democratic self-government, may initially
seem to present a crucially different case. Surely, one might suppose, the
value of democratic self-government is reducible without residue to merely
pragmatic values. Surely the pragmatist can say everything that anyone
would reasonably want to say about democratic self-government. One can
at least imagine a democratic pragmatist counting votes without worrying
whether metaphysical freedom of the will underlies the votes cast.
This is indeed largely, but not entirely, right. The contemporary prag-
matist's interest in democracy can be just as prominent as anyone else's.164
And the practices of counting ballots and assigning each ballot a certain
weight165 seem merely cultural or even mechanical rather than meta-
physical. Much of the logic of democratic self-governance166 can, indeed,
be expressed in pragmatic terms.
But again, there may be some things we want to say about our deepest
understanding of the value of democratic self-government that can be said
at most only superficially within the limits of pragmatism. 167 Consider the
164. See, e.g., I RORTY, supra note 61, at 175. See also RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR
COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1999). See Richard J.
Bernstein, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and
Philosophy, 15 POL. THEORY 538 (1987) (commenting on Rorty's book); Richard Rorty, Thugs
and Theorists, 15 POL. THEORY 564 (1987) (responding to Bernstein's article). See JOHN
DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1977) (1916) (discussing the classical theory); Hilary
Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671 (1990) (discussing
the contemporary theory).
165. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (judicial skepticism of any quantifiable departure from
equality of individual vote strength).
166. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) (discussing the dem-
ocratic self-governance value as underlying freedom of speech); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT,
INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA (1999) (same); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH (1996) (noting "[allthough some view the First Amendment as a protection of the
individual interest in self-expression, a far more plausible theory ... views the First Amendment
as a protection of popular sovereignty"); Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 145-46 (stating "the
application of a principle of freedom of speech to political affairs is centrally important"); Vincent
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 547.
167. And in a roughly parallel way, this could be true as well of discussions of tolerance, and
why tolerance should in particular cases be valued. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); JOHN LOCKE, AN
ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERANCE 31 (James H. Tully ed., 1983) (1689) (noting "the care of souls
cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true
and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be
acceptable to God") (metaphysically laden, if in the extreme, and substantively fallacious). Com-
pare this argument with the observations of Richard Rorty discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 87-90 (tolerance and the limits of tolerance presumably without metaphysics). See JEREMY
WALDRON, LOCKE, TOLERATION AND THE RATIONALITY OF PERSECUTION IN JOHN LOCKE: A
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approach taken to democratic self-government in general and to
proportional representation in particular by Professor Lani Guinier. Pro-
fessor Guinier argues that, "[b]lacks cannot enjoy equal dignity ... until
black representatives join the council of government."168 She defines a
vision of "civic inclusion" 169 partly in terms of "equal political dignity."
70
Professor Guinier's normative argument frequently refers to the idea of
dignity in various contexts.171
Certainly, reference to the idea of dignity in various electoral contexts
does not commit one to metaphysics of any serious sort.17 2 Electoral indig-
nity can refer merely to a system that involves more systematic inequalities
than the speaker prefers. But the idea of dignity inevitably draws meaning
and strength from, and has often been deployed within, some metaphysical,
supra-pragmatic context. 173 Most naturally imagine a powerful normative
theory of dignity and equality in the context of voting rights, free speech, or
any other constitutional context as having a significant metaphysical
dimension.174 It is of course this metaphysical dimension, of whatever sort
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 98 (Susan Mendus & John Horton eds., 1991) (criticizing
commentary on Locke's approach to tolerance). See generally TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE
VIRTUE (David Heyd ed., 1996) (discussing broadly the nature, logic, and limits of toleration).
See also HERBERT MARCUSE, REPRESSIVE TOLERANCE IN A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 110
(Robert P. Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., & Herbert Marcuse 1965)
168. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 34 (1994) (reprinting Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black
Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 421 (1989)).
169. Id. at 34 (quoting Pamela Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: Going Beyond Single-
Member Districts in Section 2 Cases, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1989)).
170. Id.
171. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REv. 1413, 1431 (1991) (stating "[d]ignity as participants in the political sphere[,]" "the dignity of
minorities"). She also refers to dignity as "offense to black voters' dignity." Id. at 1431 n.65.
Two more examples are referring to the value of "equal political dignity" and "dignity ... to the
strongly held sentiments of minorities[.]" Id. at 1480.
172. GUINIER, supra note 168, at 109. Professor Guinier indicates that "[b]y extending my
speculative reconstruction of political equality to legislative deliberations, I am not.. . articulating
a grand moral theory of politics." Id. Putnam, supra note 164, at 1696 (describing Deweyan de-
mocracy as aspirationally seeking "a society that develops the capacities of all its men and women
to think for themselves, to participate in the design and testing of social policies, and to judge the
results"). Putnam's account here seems to leave open the question of whether developing one
capacity rather than another can be objectively better or worse.
173. GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN (A. Robert
Caponigri trans. 1956) (1486).
174. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776). Note that while the
Declaration contains religious references, metaphysics of course need not and cannot be confined
to religion or to religious metaphysics. Id. In the free speech context, we can, for example, imag-
ine a secular metaphysics of freedom that might underlie John Stuart Mill's approach to free
speech. The courts often refer to the idea of dignity in ways that may be read as trans-pragmatic
and certainly not religious. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 755, 763 (1983) (Brennan
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (stating "today's ruling denigrates the values of individual autonomy
and dignity central to many constitutional rights"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)
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and however developed, that is crucially unavailable to the pragmatist
account of democratic self-government as a free speech value.
B. PRAGMATISM AND FREE SPEECH: INDETERMINACY, ZOMBIE
VIOLENCE, AND THE LIVED NIGHTMARE
The very popularity of pragmatist approaches to philosophy, law, and
to free speech in particular has led to, or resulted from, an expansion of the
meanings of "pragmatism." In its most important contemporary philo-
sophical sense, pragmatism is, of course, associated with distrust or
rejection of metaphysics, knowledge, aspiration to, objectivity of truth and
such, for the sake of some sort of payoff. 175 But some courts 176 and
contemporary legal writers wish to use the term "pragmatism" to refer
merely to their non-dogmatic, case-by-case, pluralistic, contextualized,
payoff-conscious, anti-formalistic, "commonsensical" approach to legal
issues. 177 Pragmatism in this limited sense is just as concerned as Rortyan
philosophical pragmatism 78 with outcomes or payoffs, but is less interested
in philosophical reform and controversy.
Oddly, pragmatism of all sorts seems incapable of persuasively
reaching determinate judicial outcomes in free speech and other cases any
more readily than non-pragmatist approaches. This is not to suggest that
the scope of the indeterminacy problems faced by non-pragmatist judges is
less substantial than that faced by pragmatist judges. 7 9 It is ironic, though,
(referring to the "premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests"
within the free speech context).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 59-79
176. In the free speech context, see, e.g., the references to the value of pragmatism in a
contextualized, case-by-case, less overtly theory-laden sense in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957) (quoting Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4
VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1951)); Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 673 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing
Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 441-42).
177. Among the leading contemporary legal theorists of pragmatism in this less strictly
philosophically-oriented sense would be writers such as Daniel Farber. See infra sources cited
note 182. See also Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV.
593, 595-96 (1999) (endorsing a contextualized, institutionally internal, participatory sort of
pragmatism).
178. Of course, one could endorse much, if not all, of Rortyan philosophical pragmatism
while also adopting pragmatism in the less philosophical sense. See, e.g., Catharine Pierce Wells,
Why Pragmatism Works for Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 347, 352-53 (2000) (endorsing "a stronger
eye for context and detail" as well as the more philosophical belief that "'reality'. . . was actually a
creature of social interpretation and construction"). Wells also argues that "pragmatism relieves
us of the need for metaphysical justification" as distinct from the need to "examine our hearts to
determine who we are and what is the perceived significance of the activity in question[.]" Id. at
354.
179. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV.
339 (1996) (discussing the recurring problems of indeterminacy in judicial decision-making
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that pragmatic approaches to case adjudication, conscientiously applied, are
not especially pragmatic in the sense of readily generating one judicial
outcome rather than another. It is difficult to see why pragmatism should
be especially credited with reaching desirable judicial payoffs if it is dif-
ficult even for the pragmatist to conscientiously settle upon one case
outcome to the exclusion of another. 180
One can simultaneously emphasize only so many pragmatically
relevant considerations. Assume, for example, that a pragmatist judge, in
either the philosophical or the narrower, less philosophical sense, ad-
judicates with more careful attention to circumstances and to particularized
context 81 than does a non-pragmatic judge. It is certainly good in the ab-
stract to be sensitive to circumstance. But it is also possible that focusing
on circumstance might lead a pragmatist judge to pay somewhat less
attention to broad principle or to systematic and inherent biases in the law.
This leaves the pragmatist judge with an inescapable question: how
much weight, generally or in a given case, should a pragmatist judge give to
narrow case context and circumstance on the one hand, and how much
weight to broader systemic or structural biases on the other? It will not do
for the pragmatist judge to simply decide this methodological question itself
on a case-by-case basis. The pragmatist judge would have to show why this
methodological decision itself can safely be made on a case-by-case basis,
without accounting for any broad systematic biases that might skew just this
sort of methodological case-by-case decision-making.
Again, the point is not that non-pragmatic judges by comparison reach
satisfactory judicial outcomes by unimpeachable methods and with little
difficulty. That would be false. The point is instead that the greater the
indeterminacy in pragmatic judicial decision-making, the less likely it is
generally); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 549 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
180. As one leading contemporary pragmatist has written, "[o]nce one is freed from the
demands of global theory,. . . it is not quite clear what happens next." Wells, supra note 178, at
358. It is possible to argue that if we give up on even our best, most eclectic and inclusive global
or deep theories of free speech law, we will become either more strongly committed to free
speech, or more strongly committed to free speech in just the kinds of cases where we should be.
It is difficult, however, to see why our commitment to free speech would be enhanced if we were
unanimously content with purely pragmatic understandings of free speech and free speech values.
Giving up on metaphysics, the idea of objective truth, and such, hardly seems to especially invite
sacrifices for the sake of freedom of speech or, for that matter, sacrifices of speech for the sake of
values such as equality or personal dignity. While we may not agree on the best single "metaphy-
sical" defense of free speech, we may not agree on the best "pragmatic" account of any given free
speech case, or even on the pragmatically best case outcome. And it is hard to see why disagree-
ment about metaphysics must undermine free speech more than disagreement about pragmatics.
181. See supra text at note 178. The case of Virginia v. Black, at several points seeks to
emphasize contextual differences among public cross-burnings. See generally Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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that pragmatic judicial decision-making will consistently have any sort of
unique practical payoff.
And this is just the beginning of the important indeterminacies the
pragmatist judge must face. Consider some further dimensions of indeter-
minacy: a pragmatist judge in the philosophical sense must distrust or
avoid metaphysics, any aspirations to objectivity, or perhaps any sort of
grand theory.182 But how, if at all, should such a pragmatist judge address
grand theory? Should a pragmatist judge ever refer to pragmatism? What
is the pragmatic value of transparency or even of simple candor in judicial
decision-making? Doesn't distrust of grand theory or of metaphysics come
in degrees? What is the proper degree of such distrust according to the
pragmatist judge? Should the pragmatist judge avoid familiar metaphysics
and the like entirely? Can metaphysics in the law just be straightforwardly
judicially minimized? Is "deep" metaphysics usually worse than "shallow"
metaphysics? Is religious metaphysics worse than non-religious meta-
physics? But what if the choice is between politically progressive "deep"
metaphysics and less politically progressive "shallow" metaphysics?
Should pragmatism as a judicial method always be trumped by politics? 183
To what extent should the pragmatist judge avoid (otherwise) methodo-
logically proper decisions that may give direct or indirect "aid and comfort"
to the judge's own political antagonists?
The pragmatic judge must then confront the question of how to trade
off the value of a decision that is pragmatically right on its own terms with
the value of such a decision over time, as a stronger or weaker precedent,
and as a properly or improperly understood decision.184 Is it usually worse
for a pragmatic judicial decision to be misunderstood politically or
misunderstood methodologically? On what might this depend? Should a
182. See, e.g., supra text at notes 61-102 (discussing Richard Rorty's pragmatism); Wells,
supra note 178, at 352-54; Daniel A. Farber & Philip A. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1615-17 (1987) (pragmatism or practical reason opposed to
"grand theory," "unified theory," or "foundationalism"); id. at 1635, 1637 ("situation sense"); id.
at 1637-40 (foundationalism opposed to "a web of mutually reinforcing values"); id. at 1646-47
("skepticism of rigid dichotomies," "tolerance for ambiguity," "contextual justification," and
"overall humility"); Farber, supra note 2, at 164-69 (to similar effect). See also Daniel A. Farber,
Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988). Robin West links
pragmatism with an emphasis on experience, induction, empiricism, and a critical focus on need.
Robin West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 673 (1985).
183. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 16 (1997) (generally
subordinating an eclectic methodology that distrusts objectivity and truth to pre-existing political
commitments).
184. See DAVID H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM 50-62 (1967)
(discussing the context of various sorts of utilitarian theories with varying levels of acceptance
and compliance).
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pragmatic judge ever attempt to consider forms of likely resistance to or the
likely overextension or abuse of the judicial decision? The pragmatic judge
may be inclined to take as many such practical considerations into account
as possible. But at some point this inclination becomes unpragmatic and
goes beyond judicial heroism into hubris. 185 What few, simple rules might
guide the pragmatic judge better than all the above complex inquiries?
The indeterminacies multiply: if the pragmatic judge is to consider any
sort of practical consequence, what time frame is to be encompassed, and
who are the persons or entities for whom consequences are to count? 86 To
what extent do non-members of the community, the distant future, or nature
itself pragmatically count? 8 7 To what extent do any non-pragmatist values
or even anti-pragmatic values actually held by legislators, agencies, other
judges, or the litigants themselves count? Should the pragmatist judge re-
spect non-pragmatist values only to the degree that they can be translated
into pragmatist values, even if this undercuts the popular credibility of the
pragmatist judge's decision? Should the pragmatist judge's first loyalties
be to those groups with whom the judge most identifies?I88 But what if
these first loyalties in turn counsel a broad pattern of social concern,18 9
perhaps broader than the general public is as yet psychologically prepared
to accept? Pragmatism by itself does not tell us what role various sorts of
education of the public should play in different sorts of adjudication.
The point is that however we conceive of pragmatism in the law, we
cannot intelligently evaluate any form of such pragmatism based on the ap-
peal of its broad self-description, its explicit emphases, and its general
goals. Most of the real interest in any form of pragmatism in the law must
lie in its very particularized formulation and detailed practical application.
185. Recall that Dworkin's judicial Hercules is "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning,
patience, and acumen." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1975). A
pragmatist judge must recognize that trying to absorb too many practical considerations, beyond a
certain point, will itself become counterproductive and in this basic sense self-defeatingly
unpragmatic.
186. Compare, for example, the controversial moral claims asserted on behalf of some non-
human animals by PETER SINGER, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS (Tom Regan &
Peter Singer eds., 2d ed. 1989). More broadly, the pragmatic emphasis on contextualism must
somehow be clarified. Professor Steven D. Smith has observed that "[p]ragmatism would.., be
useful if it could provide guidance about how to select the proper context for controversial issues;
but on that question, unfortunately, pragmatists offer little help." Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of
Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 435 (1990). See also id. at 448 (stating "[the remedy, if there is
one, for the failures of recent theorizing lies not in a pragmatic flight from theory, but rather in
better and more courageous theorizing").
187. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM (1999); see also Lisa Heinzerling,
Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421 (2000) (reviewing Farber's work).
188. See supra notes 88-91 (citing some of Rorty's primary adopted loyalties).
189. See supra notes 83-87.
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Consider the judicial pragmatism of Richard Posner, which overlaps
with, but is in some respects distinct from, Rorty's philosophical pragma-
tism. Posner's judicial pragmatism seeks to somehow avoid moral philo-
sophy190 and moral theory'91 as useless 92 to adjudication and even to legal
doctrine. 93 Instead, Judge Posner advocates attention to case precedent,
clear legal text, social science and policy, common sense, intuition, public
opinion, and "immersion in the facts."194 With regard to constitutional is-
sues in particular, Judge Posner emphasizes attention to social context,
causes, costs, and consequences.195 All of this is in some sense informed by
the desire "to maximize the social utility of the law."' 196 The latter goal we
shall temporarily assume to be merely a matter of intuition or perhaps
"common sense,"1 97 and not at all a matter of moral theory or philosophy.198
190. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY viii (1999).
191. Id. at ix.
192. Id. at viii-ix.
193. Id. at viii.
194. Id.
195. Id. at x.
196. Id. at xi.
197. Id. at viii.
198. Id. at viii-ix. Posner is in some respects herein influenced by Justice Holmes. See, e.g.,
id. at viii n. I (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)). See also
id. at 11 (discussing Nazi Germany in a way suggestive of Holmesian metaethics). See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 991 (1997) (1897) (discussing the
question of Holmesian pragmatism); David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of
Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 465 n.41 (1994) (discussing conflicting views of any
linkage between Holmes' views and pragmatism, along with some textual evidence). See also
Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: Holmes' Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 46
FLA. L. REV. 353, 357 n.16 (1997) (stating "because Holmes was indifferent to the flourishing or
happiness of all members of society, he should not be regarded as a pragmatist"). See Mathias
Reimann, Horrible Holmes, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1676 (2002) (responding to Alschuler's article).
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, SELECTED WRITINGS 149 (Hall ed., 1947) (discussing the broader
influence of generalized pragmatism in American jurisprudence). Cardozo states, "the juristic
philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism. Its truth is relative, not
absolute. The rule that functions well produces a title deed to recognition." Id. (quoted in Gertz
v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 403 (1974) (White, J., dissenting)). But see Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970) (conscientious objector exemption case) (contrasting "moral, ethical, or
religious principle" with "considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency"); Ehlert v. United
States, 402 U.S. 99, 108, 112 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (linking one sense of pragmatism to
considerations of policy or expediency).
Elsewhere, Judge Posner has emphasized the impossibility or the uninterestingness of
pursuing the foundations of knowledge, truth, and objectivity as the sort of pragmatism in which
he is interested. In this, Judge Posner follows the lead of Richard Rorty. See Rosenfeld, supra
note 77, at 110-34 (discussing some similarities and differences between Posner's and Rorty's
versions of pragmatism). Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First
Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 738 (2002). Posner elaborates in this fashion:
The test for knowledge should not be whether it puts us in touch with an ultimate
reality... but whether it is useful in helping us to achieve our ends. The human mind
developed not to build a pipeline to the truth but to cope with the physical
environment in which human beings evolved, and so a proposition should be tested
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Given the breadth and indeed the largely common sense character of
Judge Posner's methodology, there is certainly nothing to prevent the
Posnerian judicial pragmatist from reaching any sensible result in any free
speech case. One must ask, though, whether Posner's pragmatism yields a
determinate free speech case result more often than would a sensible non-
pragmatic, theory-laden approach to free speech. Ultimately, we must also
determine whether Posnerian pragmatism in free speech cases must
indirectly rely on the sort of moral theory Posner wishes to avoid.
Let us take, as a representative example of Judge Posner's recent free
speech jurisprudence, the violent video game ordinance case of American
Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick.199 Kendrick involved a
successful free speech challenge to an Indianapolis ordinance restricting
not by its correspondence with "reality" but by the consequences of believing or
disbelieving it.
Id. Consequences under consideration are to include systemic as well as immediate consequences.
Id.
Under such pragmatism, the question of why we should choose one set of ends rather than
another looms especially large. And it is still difficult to accept that whether we should believe, in
one fashion or another, the Holocaust accounts reported above depends upon whether such belief
would help us to achieve our non-metaphysically tainted chosen ends. Certainly, believing these
accounts may happen to offer some sufficient payoff in terms of some selected non-metaphysical
ends. But even if the consequences of such beliefs were ultimately disturbing or subversive of
some of our ends, we would still face a choice. We might choose to admit such accounts, and
change our non-metaphysical ends to accommodate the truth of such accounts.
More simply, there is Professor Jed Rubenfeld's response to Posner in this regard:
Posner's "pragmatist" thinks we should believe that dropped objects will fall toward
the earth because it is useful to believe it .... Posner's "pragmatist" will have a hard
time explaining why it is so useful to believe that dropped objects will fall toward the
earth. He will miss the clearest reason why: namely, because dropped objects do fall
toward the earth-because, in other words, the proposition is true.
Jed Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 764-65 (2002). Actually, it is not diffi-
cult, within the confines of pragmatism, to explain the usefulness of this sort of belief. One pos-
sibility is that such a belief tends to contribute to the believer's hypothetical project of enhancing
his or her genetic fitness. See COLIN MCGINN, ETHIcs, EVIL, AND FICTION 50 (1997) (discussing
false beliefs of this sort, as opposed to false moral beliefs, as typically naturally self-punishing).
However, such explanations invite questions as to the value and status of one's chosen ends.
There seems a certain arbitrariness in non-philosophically preferring one public policy over an-
other, even in the rare case in which the winners and losers would be the same under either public
policy.
See Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1735 (1998)
(discussing and critiquing Posnerian pragmatism, addressing in particular Richard A. Posner, The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998)); Daniel A. Farber,
Shocking the Conscience: Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning, and the Judiciary, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 675, 687 (1999) (arguing nonetheless, although in some sense a pragmatist himself,
that "Posner's discussion sometimes seems oddly oblivious to notions of human dignity"); Jeremy
Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 597, 600-01 (2000) (distinguishing between
questions of improvement along some measure and questions of distribution and fairness); John
Mikhail, Law, Science and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral
and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1080-81 (2002) (discussing Posner's pragmatism);
Peter Berkowitz, Reduction and Betrayal, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 1999, at 38.
199. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994 (2001).
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minors' unaccompanied access to arcade video machines featuring defined
sorts of "graphic violence." 200 Judge Posner sought, and did not find,
"compelling and not merely plausible" 201 grounds for believing that the
video games in question caused sufficient harm to either the players them-
selves or to the public at large to justify the speech restrictions. 202
Judge Posner's account of the ordinance's unconstitutionality was
broad-based and could conceivably draw upon each of the pragmatic
considerations Posner cites as a pragmatic theorist. 203 At its broadest,
Posner's argument is that in Kendrick:
The murderous fanaticism displayed by young German soldiers in
World War II, alumni of the Hitler Jugend, illustrates the danger of
allowing government to control the access of children to infor-
mation and opinion. Now that eighteen-year-olds have the right to
vote, it is obvious that they must be allowed to form their political
views on the basis of uncensored speech before they turn eighteen,
so that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the
franchise. And since an eighteen-year-old's right to vote is a right
personal to him... the right of parents to enlist the aid of the state
to shield their children from ideas of which the parents disapprove
cannot be plenary either. People are unlikely to become well-
functioning, independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if
they are raised in an intellectual bubble.204
Judge Posner's conclusions have proven persuasive. 205 It is certainly
possible for a sensible pragmatist to reach an opposite result, on various
200. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573. Indianapolis' best known free speech case is American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
201. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 576.
202. Id. at 576-77.
203. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
204. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577 (emphasis in the original). There follow references to
graphic violence in, inter alia, HOMER, THE ODYSSEY; DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY;
LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE; MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN. See WILLIAM SHAKE-
SPEARE, THE HISTORY OF KING LEAR, act 3, sc. 7 (depicting the interaction between Gloucester
and Cornwall). Actually, it seems only partially, and not entirely, accurate to characterize parental
objections to violent video game play by minors as a desire to suppress access to disfavored ideas,
in a way that would narrow the child's intellectual universe. One could certainly wish for a minor
to thoroughly understand the nature and roles of violence in the world without also wishing for the
minor to spend substantial amounts of time in violent (or any other sort of) video game play.
More generally, violent video game play may involve intellectual opportunity costs.
205. See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting "most
federal courts to consider the issue have found video games to be constitutionally protected");
Bookfriends, Inc. v. Taft, 223 F. Supp. 2d 932, 947 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Kendrick, 244 F.3d at
572); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 182 (D. Conn. 2002); Sanders v.
Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (D. Colo. 2002) (applying Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). See Michael T. Morley, "Exceedingly Vexed and Difficult": Games
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pragmatic grounds. Doubtless, it is impossible, beyond some level of rigor,
to causally link graphically violent video game use in public by unsuper-
vised minors with any judicially cognizable social harm. Reasonable
pragmatists could, however, suspect that it will virtually never be possible
to rigorously prove that such a narrowly described cultural phenomenon,
and not some other factor or set of factors, causally underlies any general
social harm. Common sense suggests it is practically impossible to sort out
any effects of the relatively few regulated violent video games from the
effects of the mass of unregulated such games, violent movies, violent
television scenes, and other sorts of violent imagery in a violence-suffused
media culture. The chances of an otherwise conscientious and informed
future citizen growing up with an insufficient awareness of violence, or of
any other social idea or phenomenon, because of the ordinance in question
seem limited.
A pragmatist might, applying a different sort of intuition, "common
sense," or public opinion, 206 conclude instead that unsupervised youthful
virtual "amputation, decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation,
maiming or... [disfigurement]"207 actually provide no unique and irre-
placeable element of effective citizenship or bulwark against the rise of
Nazism or any other totalitarian movement.208 Common sense is unsur-
prised by the apparent fact that the military actually uses violent video
games to train soldiers.209 Common sense sees the abhorred SS mentality
as itself distinctively and not coincidentally violence-oriented and sadistic.
Common sense might equally suppose that blankness of mind210 and being
"raised in an intellectual bubble"211 have very little to do with the presence
or absence of the ordinance in question. The main purpose and effect of
such an ordinance, given widespread alternative access to violent imagery,
might in fact be symbolic.212 But the pragmatist need not object either to
and the First Amendment, 112 YALE L.J. 361, 366-68 (2002) (discussing the expressive
communication issue).
206. See supra text accompanying note 195.
207. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573 (quoting the ordinance).
208. Id. at 577.
209. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1137
(E.D. Mo. 2002) rev'd remanded by, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
210. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577.
211. Id.
212. See Christopher E. Smith, Law and Symbolism, 1997 DET. C.L. REV. 935, 940-45
(1997). We should be reluctant to assume that symbolic government acts are pointless acts or that
they are even symbolically ineffective and ultimately inconsequential. See MURRAY EDELMAN,
THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 172 (1964). Edelman argues "mass publics respond to
currently conspicuous political symbols: not to 'facts,' and not to moral codes embedded in the
character or soul," furthermore "[p]olitics can therefore become a residual supplier of the symbols
that [persons] require." Id. at 184.
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benign symbolism in general nor to any of the benign symbolic purposes
conceivably underlying the Indianapolis ordinance at issue.
None of this is to suggest that Judge Posner's disposition of the
ordinance case was in fact wrong in pragmatic terms. Rather, the point is
that a conscientious pragmatist could reasonably conclude, for example,
that the ordinance's literally tokenistic impediments to youthful public vir-
tual dismemberment of or by zombies 213 do not impair free speech interests
in such a way as to outweigh whatever symbolic value the ordinance may
have. Therefore, one may presume that there is some sensible but less thor-
oughly "pragmatic" approach to free speech that can address this case in a
way no less determinate than can judicial pragmatism.
Of course, indeterminacy is one thing, and ultimate satisfactoriness is
another. Whether Judge Posner reached the right judicial result in Kendrick
or not, pragmatist approaches to Kendrick and to free speech cases more
generally must be compared in their ultimate satisfactoriness with the best
available supra-pragmatist accounts. On this score, we must not grant any
advantage to the latter merely because they are metaphysically more
ambitious. But it should also be permissible to judge some more metaphy-
sical account of the scope and limits of free speech law to be a richer,
deeper, and more satisfactory account of free speech law than any
pragmatic alternative. It is certainly far from clear that Kendrick represents,
in context, our best accommodation of the free speech values of the pursuit
of truth, democracy, and self-realization.
As we have seen indirectly in connection with Holocaust accounts and
directly in connection with the values underlying free speech, the satis-
factoriness of an approach to free speech must, all else equal, depend on
that approach's openness to the possibility of an encounter-sometimes a
confrontation-with metaphysical depth, truth, and objectivity.214 Judge
Posner's free speech theory, however, cannot go any deeper than is allowed
by his consciously avoiding metaphysical commitments. Certainly, the free
speech pragmatist judge can speak with any borrowed vocabulary and at
any level of vehemence. Crucial, though, is how deep or shallow an
account of the free speech values of self-realization, truth, and even
democracy judicial pragmatism can allow. Our examination above of the
potential depth, richness, and meaningfulness of non-pragmatic accounts of
these free speech values, and the relative thinness of pragmatic accounts of
these values, leaves little grounds for optimism.
213. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577.
214. See supra Part IV.A.
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Posnerian free speech pragmatism thus leaves much to be desired.
Certainly as Judge Posner indicates in Kendrick in particular,215 there can
be pragmatic intra-conversational, intra-cultural, non-metaphysical appeals
against Nazism. Judge Posner argues that the trial of the Nazi leaders "was
right not because it could produce proof that the Nazis really were
immoralists; they were, but according to our lights, not theirs." 216 But, this
sort of pragmatic approach does not begin to accommodate all of the most
significant dimensions of the Holocaust experience. 217 Not everything a-
bout the Holocaust can be reduced to a culturally optional conversation, a
selected cultural identification, one's own inescapable situatedness, and a
distaste for metaphysics. Some experiences transcend such grounds and
limitations. They would, as lived nightmares, retain their actual moral char-
acter even if all our conversations and cultural identifications permanently
changed in such a way as to ignore or downplay the Holocaust.
Let us conclude merely by briefly revisiting the objective, culturally
transcendent nightmare of the Holocaust. In particular, let us consider what
Primo Levi referred to as the "deliberate creation of pain that was an end in
itself."218 Levi asks:
What else was the purpose of emptying out nursing homes filled
with elderly sick people already near death and hauling them off to
215. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
216. POSNER, supra note 190, at II (emphasis in the original). In this, Posner follows
Holmes's general lead. Holmes wrote to Harold Laski of German military tactics during World
War I in these terms:
I often think of the way our side shrieked during the late war at various things done by
the Germans such as the use of gas. We said gentlemen don't do such things-to
which the Germans: "Who the hell are you? We do them." There was no superior
tribunal to decide-so logically the Germans stood as well as we did.
Letter from Holmes to Laski of April 18, 1930, in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935 1238 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (emphasis in the original). Holmes is, presumably, not making the nar-
rowly legal point that international law did not or could not adjudicate as between the American
and German views. See Heidi Margaret Hurd, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on
Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417, 1429-30 (1988) (discussing Homesian pragmatism and
moral relativism). See Catharine Pierce Wells, Reinventing Holmes: The Hidden Life of a Cyni-
cal, Ambitious, Detached and Fascistic Old Judge Without Values, 37 TULSA L. REV. 801 (2002)
(reviewing ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF
JUSTICE HOLMES (2000)) (discussing a more sympathetic account of Holmes from a particular
pragmatist perspective). This is not to suggest that there are sets of concepts and categories, or
language of any sort, that fully and adequately depict and convey the lived nightmare of the
Holocaust. Whether a pragmatist might wish to claim otherwise, to the credit or discredit of prag-
matism, is unclear. See POSNER, supra note 106, at 379 (discussing a possible legal distinction
between generally targeted protest marches by American neo-Nazis and more personally targeted
neo-Nazi abuse).
217. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
218. Cynthia Ozick, Review of Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, March 21, 1988, at 32-36.
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Auschwitz to be gassed? Or forcing grown men to lap up soup
like dogs by depriving them of spoons (of which there were tens of
thousands at Auschwitz)? Or using human ash from the crema-
toria to make "gravel" paths for the SS villagers that ruled the
camp? Or selling human hair to the German textile industry for
mattress ticking? Or locking human beings into decompression
chambers to establish at what altitude human blood begins to boil:
a datum that can be obtained in any laboratory at minimum
expense and without victims... ? 219
Here, in this form of inflicting pain and humiliation for its own sake,
was a practice that both pragmatists and non-pragmatist of course want,
each in their own way, to condemn. One is ultimately left to choose be-
tween an intra-cultural, intra-conversational, pragmatic condemnation, and
a condemnation that would remain valid even if one lost his or her way, and
even if values and identifications were changed and we took evil for good.
In a similar, though obviously less dramatic way, we cannot say all that we
want to say about the values underlying free speech and the limits of free
speech if we rest content with pragmatism.
219. Id. It is reported that at the Auschwitz crematoria, "[t]here were wooden benches along
the walls, and above these benches there were pegs and coat hangers .... The pegs were
numbered and the signs told the prisoners to remember their numbers so that they could retrieve
their clothes after the baths." OTTO FRIEDRICH, THE KINGDOM OF AUSCHWITZ 68 (1994) (1982).
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